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1. Foreword 
 
The United States Department of Justice, joined by the Attorneys General of 20 
States and the District of Columbia, filed on May 18, 1998 a major antitrust suit against 
Microsoft (DOJ Complaint 98-12320).  In United States v. Microsoft, Microsoft (“MS”) 
is mainly accused of:  
 
1. Monopolization of the market for operating systems (“OSs”) for Personal 
Computers (“PCs”) through the use of anti-competitive contractual arrangements 
with various vendors of related goods such as with computer manufacturers and 
Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) and of other actions taken to preserve and 
enhance its monopoly, and that these acts are illegal under §2 of the Sherman Act; 
2. Attempting monopolize the market for Internet browsers (but failing to succeed) 
which is illegal under §2 of the Sherman Act; 
3. Anti-competitive bundling of the Internet Explorer (“IE”), the MS Internet 
browser, with the Windows operating systems, which is illegal under §1 of 
Sherman Act. 
 
The district court found for the plaintiffs in almost all allegations.  In particular, 
Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson found that:  
 
1. The relevant antitrust market is the PC operating systems market for Intel-
compatible computers, in which Microsoft has a monopoly “where it enjoys a 
large and stable market share.” 
2. Microsoft’s monopoly is protected by the “applications barrier to entry,” which 
the judge defines as the availability of an abundance of applications running 
Windows. 
3. Microsoft used its monopoly power in the PC operating systems market to 
exclude rivals and harm competitors. 
4. Microsoft hobbled the innovation process. 
5. Microsoft’s actions harmed consumers. 
6. Various Microsoft contracts had anti-competitive implications, but Microsoft is 
not guilty of anti-competitive exclusive dealing contracts hindering the 
distribution of Netscape Navigator. 
 
One of the key problems in the government’s case was a novel theory of predation 
proposed (and ultimately accepted by the district court) by Professor Franklin Fisher of 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who was an expert witness for the 
government.  According to this theory, an act is predatory if it “involves a deliberate 
sacrifice of profits in order to gain or protect monopoly rents as opposed to gaining of 
rents through superior skill, foresight, and industry.” 
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As I discuss in detail in this paper, this theory of predation is deeply flawed for a 
number of reasons: (i) it can classify as predatory acts that do not involve below-cost 
pricing; (ii) it does not require that profits be recovered in the long run through a price 
increase; (iii) it is too vague and hard to implement since a judge would need to know 
what monopoly profits would have existed if the act that may be characterized as anti-
competitive were not taken, and the extent that this particular act has affected monopoly 
profits; (iv) moreover, in the hypothetical long run in which the alleged anti-competitive 
act did not occur, profits need to be calculated when the firm has implemented other 
strategies not used at present because, for example, they were substitutes to the act that 
may be characterized as anti-competitive, or were in conflict with it; (vi) the Fisher rule 
requires that monopoly rents in each of the comparisons above be divided into rents that 
arise out of “superior skill, foresight, and industry” and those above that level, a very 
difficult task especially in the various hypothetical situations; and (vii) since economists 
have a multitude of oligopoly models and cannot agree on which is best, it may be almost 
impossible for the court to correctly and with high confidence make the calculations 
required by the Fisher rule.  Use of the Fisher rule can easily characterize aggressive pro-
competitive actions of firms as predatory and anti-competitive.  If it is widely adopted, 
repeated antitrust intervention will coach aggressive competitors not be that aggressive 
and to instead accommodate competitors, resulting in very significant losses to 
consumers. 
 
The Microsoft case is the most important antitrust case of the “new economy” 
thus far.  Unfortunately, its legal battle was fought to a very large extent without the use 
of the economics tools that are at the foundation of the new economy and were key to the 
business success of Microsoft, as is explained in this paper.   There are a number of 
reasons for this.  First, often times legal cases are created and filed before an economist is 
found who will create the appropriate economic model to support the case.  Second, the 
economic theory of networks is so inadequate and unsettled that there is no commonly 
accepted body of knowledge on market structure with network externalities, based on 
which one could evaluate deviations toward anti-competitive behavior.  Third, the legal 
system has tremendous inertia to new ideas and models.  Fourth, the legal system is ill-
equipped to deal with complex technical matters.  Fifth, given all these facts, lawyers on 
both sides find it easier to fight the issues on well-treaded ground even if the problems 
are really of a different nature..  I hope that in the last parts of the legal process of this 
case, as well as in the next new economy antitrust case, there will be a deeper 
understanding of the economics of networks and of the way the law should apply to 
network industries. 
 
 
2. Introduction and Brief Procedural History  
 
This is a review of a number of issues that arise from the current major antitrust 
case of the United States and 19 States against Microsoft.1   During the last few years, the 
                                                          
Editor’s Note: Parts of this paper are based on Nicholas Economides, The Microsoft Antitrust Case, and 
The Microsoft Antitrust Case: Rejoinder, both forthcoming under Journal of Industry, Competition, and 
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Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice of the United States have 
investigated Microsoft on various antitrust allegations.  The 1991-1993 and 1993-1994 
investigations by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) ended with no lawsuits.  The 
1994 investigation2 by the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) was terminated 
with a consent decree in 1995.3  The key provisions of the 1995 consent decree were: 
 
1. Microsoft agreed to end “per-processor” contracts with computer manufacturers 
(Original Equipment Manufacturers, “OEMs”) but it was allowed to use 
unrestricted quantity discounts. 
 
2. “Microsoft shall not enter into any License Agreement in which the terms of that 
agreement are expressly or impliedly conditioned upon the licensing of any other 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Trade: From Theory to Policy, in August 2001. Both papers may be accessed at the personal page of the 
author, at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/cvnoref.html. 
 
*Nicholas Economides: B.Sc., London School of Economics (first class honors), M.A., University of 
California at Berkeley, Ph.D., University of California at Berkeley. Professor Economides is currently a 
Professor of Economics at the Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, NY, and 
Visiting Professor of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, and may be reached at (212) 998-
0864, or (650) 724-5270, fax (212) 995-4218, e-mail: neconomi@stern.nyu.edu, or  
economid@stanford.edu.  For a list of publications, see  http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/cvnoref.html. 
His web site on the Economics of Networks at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/ has been ranked as one 
of the top 5 economics sites worldwide by The Economist magazine. His fields of specialization and 
research include the economics of networks, especially of telecommunications, computers and information, 
the economics of technical compatibility and standardization, industrial organization and the structure and 
organization of financial markets. Professor Economides also focuses on the application of public policy to 
network industries. He has published widely in the areas of networks, telecommunications, oligopoly, 
antitrust, product positioning and on liquidity and the organization of financial markets and exchanges. 
He has previously taught at Columbia University and Stanford University and has been a Visiting Scholar 
at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The author wishes to state that he is not a consultant of the 
United States Department of Justice, Microsoft, or any of the Attorneys General of the 19 States and the 
District of Columbia that are suing Microsoft. 
 
1  Microsoft is a large diversified computer software manufacturer.  Microsoft produces the 
Windows family of operating systems for personal computers and servers.  It also produces applications 
software that run on the Windows family of operating systems, most notably the very successful MS-Office 
Suite consisting of Word (word processor), Excel (spreadsheet), PowerPoint (presentations), Outlook (e-
mail and news), and Access (database).  Microsoft produces software, including operating systems for PC 
(Windows 95, 98, NT, 2000), operating systems for local network and Internet servers (Windows NT, 
2000), “back-office” products for network and Internet servers, Internet clients, Internet and network 
servers, desktop applications (Office, Word, Excel, Access, Outlook, PowerPoint, MS-Money, etc.), games, 
and programming languages (Visual Basic, Java).  Microsoft also produces services, including Internet 
service (MSN, WebTV), Internet content (MSN), and product support, and some hardware such as branded 
mice, keyboards, etc.  Almost all Microsoft products are complementary to a member of the Windows 
family of operating systems for personal computers and servers. 
 
2  DOJ sued Microsoft on July 15, 1994, under 15 U.S.C. § 2 of the Sherman Act, alleging that 
Microsoft had entered into licensing agreements with OEMs that prevented other operating system vendors 
from gaining widespread distribution of their products.   
 
3  The Microsoft court entered the consent decree as its Final Judgment on April 21, 1995. 
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Covered Product, Operating System Software product or other product (provided, 
however, that this provision in and of itself shall not be construed to prohibit 
Microsoft from developing integrated products); or the OEM not licensing, 
purchasing, using or distributing any non-Microsoft product.”4 
 
Thus, the 1995 consent decree imposes two restrictions, one horizontal, and one 
vertical.  The horizontal restriction stops Microsoft from conditioning the payment of 
OEMs on the total number of personal computers they produce.  However, it allows for 
quantity discounts to OEMs. 
 
 
                                                          
The vertical restriction of the 1995 consent decree prohibits product bundling 
created by contract, but allows Microsoft to keep expanding the number and type of 
functions of its products, including Windows.  In short, in the 1995 consent decree 
contractual bundling was disallowed, but technological bundling was explicitly allowed.5  
As we will see, this issue was of crucial importance in the instant case. 
 
During 1997, Senator Orin Hatch (R-Utah) held congressional hearings on 
Microsoft that featured Microsoft’s CEO Bill Gates, Netscape’s CEO Jim Barksdale, Sun 
CEO Scott McNealy, and PC manufacturer Michael Dell, among others.  Senator Hatch 
took the position that if present antitrust law cannot deal with various anti-competitive 
acts attributed to Microsoft, Congress should change or enhance the antitrust laws.6  Sun 
Microsystems, Oracle, IBM, Netscape, and Novell formed a loose coalition lobbying 
intensely for antitrust action against Microsoft.7 
 
On October 20, 1997, DOJ alleged that Microsoft violated the 1995 consent 
decree by bundling Internet Explorer (“IE”) with the Windows operating systems, and 
requiring computer manufacturers to distribute IE with Windows 95.  DOJ petitioned the 
4  Final Judgment, Civil Action No. 94-1564. 
 
5  Microsoft has expanded over the years before and after the 1995 consent decree the functionality 
included in Windows, leading to the elimination of some stand-alone add-ons markets.  For example, 
Microsoft included a disk defragmenter in Windows 1995 and the market for defragmenters promptly died.  
Similarly, when hard disk compression was included in Windows 1995, the market for disk compression 
software died.  However, the market for fax software survived and expanded after the inclusion of fax 
capabilities in Windows 1995. 
 
6  See G. Orrin Hatch, Antitrust in the Digital Age, in  Competition, Innovation, and the Microsoft 
Monopoly: Antitrust in the Digital Marketplace, Jeffrey A. Eisenach  & Thomas M. Lenard (eds.), Kluwer 
Acad. Publishers 1999. 
  
7  See, e.g., Gary L. Reback, Memorandum Of Amici Curiae In Opposition To Proposed Final 
Judgment, Civil Action No. 94-1564. (1994). Gary Reback represented Sun and Netscape and was 
instrumental in creating this loose coalition, as well as providing the main arguments that the government 
used in this case. See Joel Brinkley & Steve Lohr, U.S. v. Microsoft 326 (McGraw Hill 2000). The authors 
also mention a Netscape “white paper” written by Wilson Sonsini lawyers Gary Reback and Susan 
Creighton and entitled White Paper Regarding the Recent Anticompetitive Conduct of the Microsoft 
Corporation,  (1996), which was never made public but was made available to the New York Times 
reporters. 
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district court to find Microsoft in civil contempt.  On December 11, 1997, Judge Thomas 
Penfield Jackson issued a preliminary injunction barring the bundling of IE with 
Windows.8  On May 12, 1998, the court of appeals for the D.C. Circuit voided the 1997 
preliminary injunction.  On June 23, 1998, the court of appeals ruled that the 1995 
consent decree did not apply to Windows 98, which was shipped with an integrated IE as 
part of the operating system and an IE icon on the PC desktop, arguing that “courts are ill 
equipped to evaluate the benefits of high-tech product design.”9 
 
During the week following the court of appeals stay of Judge Jackson’s 
preliminary injunction that barred the bundling of IE with Windows because of the 
alleged violation of the 1995 consent decree, DOJ filed a major antitrust suit against 
Microsoft.  In this action (DOJ Complaint 98-12320), filed on May 18, 1998, DOJ was 
joined by the Attorneys General of 20 States and the District of Columbia.  This paper 
focuses on this last and continuing lawsuit against Microsoft. 
 
Over the years, Microsoft has integrated in the Windows class of operating 
systems many functions and features that were originally performed by stand-alone 
products. 10   Moreover, the court of appeals in its June 23, 1998 decision affirmed that 
Microsoft’s practice of bundling IE with Windows was legal under the terms of the 1995 
consent decree.  To overcome this interpretation of the law as far as the integration of the 
browser is concerned, DOJ argued that Microsoft’s bundling of IE with Windows and its 
attempt to eliminate Netscape as a competitor in the browser market was much more than 
adding functionality to Windows and marginalizing a series of add-on software 
manufacturers.  DOJ alleged (and the district court concurred) that Microsoft added 
browser functionality to Windows and marginalized Netscape because Netscape posed a 
potential competitive threat to the Windows operating system.  This distinctive threat 
posed by Netscape was a crucial part of the DOJ allegations.  DOJ alleged that 
applications could be written to be executed “on top” of Netscape; since Netscape could 
be run on a number of operating systems, DOJ alleged that Netscape could erode the 
market power of Windows.  In DOJ’s logic, Microsoft gave away IE and integrated it in 
Windows so that Netscape would not become a platform that would compete with 
Windows.  Thus, DOJ alleged that Microsoft’s free distribution of IE, its bundling with 
Windows, and all its attempts to win the browser wars were defensive moves by 
Microsoft to protect its Windows monopoly. 
 
The Microsoft trial took place at an accelerated schedule at the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia from October 19, 1998 to June 24, 1999.  Only twelve 
                                                          
8  The Microsoft court also referred the issue to a special master, Professor Lawrence Lessig of 
Stanford. 
 
9  The court of appeals further noted that “the limited competence of courts to evaluate high-tech 
product designs and the high cost of error should make them wary of second-guessing the claimed benefits 
of a particular design decision,” see 147 F.3d at 950 n.13. 
 
10  For example, disk compression and disk de-fragmentation were not part of Windows 3.1 and were 
added to Windows 95 and 98.  
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witnesses testified from each side.  Microsoft’s CEO Bill Gates was not called as a 
witness, but his video taped deposition was extensively used during the trial.  Judge 
Jackson pre-announced that he would announce his “findings of fact” before his 
“conclusions of law.”  This was widely interpreted as implying that the judge was trying 
to give an opportunity to the sides to reach a compromise and resolve the case through a 
consent decree. 
 
On November 5, 1999, Judge Jackson issued his “findings of fact,” siding very 
strongly with the plaintiffs.  In December 1999, Richard Posner, a prominent antitrust 
scholar and the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, agreed to 
serve as  mediator for settlement discussions.11  On April 1, 2000, settlement talks broke 
down after some States reportedly disagreed with the proposed agreement.12  On April 3, 
2000, Judge Jackson issued his “conclusions of law” finding for the plaintiffs on almost 
all points.  In particular, Judge Jackson found Microsoft liable for monopolization and 
anti-competitive tying of IE with Windows but found that Microsoft’s exclusive contracts 
did not make it liable for preventing Netscape from being distributed. 
 
On June 7, 2000, after an extremely short hearing,13 Judge Jackson issued his 
remedies decision, splitting Microsoft into two companies, and imposing severe business 
conduct restrictions.  Microsoft appealed, and was granted a stay of all parts of the 
district court decisions until the appeal is heard.  Although the Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit expressed its willingness to hear the case in plenary session, the district 
court agreed with the government’s proposal to petition the U. S. Supreme Court to hear 
the case immediately, invoking a rarely used provision of antitrust law.14   On September 
26, 2000, the Court indicated that it would not hear the case before the court of appeals.  
Thus, the appeals process is likely to take time.  It is widely believed that the federal 
lawsuit will be settled during the administration of President George W. Bush, who had 
stated during his election campaign that he will only pursue price fixing antitrust cases.15 
 
The nature and scope of the allegations in this case imply that its final outcome 
will determine the terms of competition in the software industry and more generally in 
network industries.  To a large extent, the application of antitrust law in network 
                                                          
11  As mediator, Judge Posner was not acting in his judicial capacity. 
 
12  See generally N. Y. Times, Apr. 2, 2000. 
 
13  The hearing was on May 24, 2000.  It started at 10:15 am, ended around 3:30 pm, and included a 
two-hour lunch break. 
 
14  DOJ argued that review by the U.S. Supreme Court was appropriate to expedite the final judgment 
because of the importance of the case for the national economy.  However, it is worth noting that the 
plaintiffs had a real interest to avoid the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit since that court ruled (June 
23, 1998) on the issue of bundling Internet Explorer and Windows 95 in the earlier Microsoft case exactly 
in the opposite way to Judge Jackson’s decision on bundling in the case being appealed. 
 
15  Interview with George W. Bush, Fin. Times (June 26, 2000). 
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industries is hampered by the fact that rigorous economic analysis of network industries 
is relatively new.   
 
3. The Economics of Markets With Network Effects 
 
In assessing the Microsoft case, it is important to remember that the case focuses 
on markets with network effects.  Network effects define crucial features of market 
structure that have to be taken into consideration in understanding competition and 
potentially anti-competitive actions in these markets. 
 
A market exhibits network effects (or network externalities)16 when the value to a 
buyer of an extra unit is higher when more units are sold, everything else being equal.  In 
a traditional network, network externalities arise because a typical subscriber can reach 
more subscribers in a larger network.17  In a virtual network,18 network externalities arise 
because larger sales of component A induce larger availability of complementary 
components B1, ..., Bn, thereby increasing the value of component A.  The increased 
value of component A results in further positive feedback.19  For example, the existence 
of an abundance of Windows-compatible applications increases the value of Windows. 
 
There are a number of crucial features of markets with network effects that 
distinguish them from other markets.  First, markets with strong network effects where 
firms can chose their own technical standards are “winner-take-most” markets.  That is, 
in these markets, there is extreme market share and profits inequality.20  The market share 
of the largest firm can easily be a multiple of the market share of the second largest, the 
second largest firm’s market share can be a multiple of the market share of the third, and 
so on.  This geometric sequence of market shares implies that, even for small n, the nth 
firm’s market share is tiny. 
 
For example, abundance of applications written for Windows increases the value 
of Windows and induces more consumers to buy Windows.  This increases the incentive 
                                                          
16  The word externality means that a good’s value is not intermediated in a market.  For the purposes 
of this paper, we will use the words “network effects” and “network externalities” interchangeably. 
 
17  See Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 Int’l J. Indus. Org. at 675-699, (visited 
Apr.23, 2001) at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/top.html.  
 
18  A virtual network is a collection of compatible goods (that share a common technical platform). 
For example, all VHS video players make up a virtual network. Similarly, all computers running Windows 
98 can be thought of as a virtual network.  
 
19  Despite the cycle of positive feedbacks, it is typically expected that the value of component A 
does not explode to infinity because the additional positive feedback is expected to decrease with increases 
in the size of the network. 
 
20  See Nicholas Economides & Frederick Flyer, Economides, Nicholas, Compatibility and Market 
Structure for Network Goods, Discussion Paper EC-98-02, Stern School of Business, N.Y.U., 1998, (visited 
Apr.23, 2001) at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/98-02.pdf.  
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for independent applications writers to write applications for Windows, and this further 
increases sales and market share for Windows.  Moreover, consumers are willing to pay 
more for the brand with the highest market share (since it has more associated 
applications), and therefore profits associated with this brand can be a large multiple of 
profits of other platforms.  This implies a very large market share for Windows, a small 
market share for the Mac, a very small market share for the third competitor, and almost 
negligible shares for the fourth and other competitors. 
 
Second, due to the natural extreme inequality in market shares and profits in such 
markets at any point in time, there should be no presumption that there were anti-
competitive actions that were responsible for the creation of the market share inequality 
or the very high profitability of a top firm.  Great inequality in sales and profits is the 
natural equilibrium in markets with network externalities and incompatible technical 
standards.  No anti-competitive acts are necessary to create this inequality.21 
 
Third, because “winner takes most” is the natural equilibrium in these markets, 
attempting to superimpose a different market structure, (say one of all firms having 
approximately equal market shares), is futile and counterproductive.  If a different market 
structure were imposed by a singular structural act (say a breakup of a dominant firm), 
the market would naturally deviate from it and instead converge to the natural inequality 
equilibrium.  If forced equality were imposed as a permanent condition, it would create 
significant social inefficiency, as discussed below. 
 
Fourth, in network markets, once few firms are in operation, the addition of new 
competitors, say under conditions of free entry, does not change the market structure in 
any significant way.  The addition of a fourth competitor to a triopoly hardly changes the 
market shares, prices, and profits of the three top competitors.22  This is true under 
                                                          
21  See Robert E. Litan, Roger G. Noll, William D. Nordhaus, & Frederic Scherer, Remedies Brief Of 
Amici Curiae (visited Apr.23, 2001), at www.aeibrookings.org/publications/related/brief.pdf. On Civil 
Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ) Litan et al. (2000) err in reasoning that Microsoft’s very high profitability is a 
clear indication of monopolization in the antitrust sense.  High profitability for the top platform is natural in 
this winner-take-most market). 
 
22  See Economides & Flyer, supra note 20.   The table below, taken from this paper, shows market 
coverage and prices as the number of firms with incompatible platforms increases.  Maximum potential 
sales was normalized to 1. 
 
Table 1:  Quantities, Market Coverage, And Prices Among Incompatible Platforms 
Number 
of firms 
I 
Sales of 
largest 
firm 
q1 
Sales of 
second 
firm 
q2 
Sales of 
third 
firm 
q3 
Market 
coverage 
ΣIj=i qj 
Price  
of  
largest firm 
p1 
Price of 
second 
firm 
p2 
Price of 
third 
firm 
p3 
Price  
of smallest 
firm 
pI 
1 0.6666   0.6666 0.222222   2.222e-1 
2 0.6357 0.2428  0.8785 0.172604 0.0294  2.948e-2 
3 0.6340 0.2326 0.0888 0.9555 0.170007 0.0231 0.0035 3.508e-3 
4 0.6339 0.2320 0.0851 0.9837 0.169881 0.0227 0.0030 4.533e-4 
5 0.6339 0.2320 0.0849 0.9940 0.169873 0.0227 0.0030 7.086e-5 
6 0.6339 0.2320 0.0849 0.9999 0.169873 0.0227 0.0030 9.88e-11 
7 0.6339 0.2320 0.0849 0.9999 0.169873 0.0227 0.0030 0 
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conditions of free entry.  Therefore, although eliminating barriers to entry can encourage 
competition, the resulting competition does not significantly affect market structure.  In 
markets with strong network effects, antitrust authorities cannot significantly affect 
equilibrium market structure by eliminating barriers to entry. 
 
Fifth, the fact that the natural equilibrium in network industries is winner-take-
most with very significant market inequality does not imply that competition is weak.  
Competition on which firm will create the top platform and reap most of the benefits is, 
in fact, very intense.  
 
Sixth, there is a more fundamental concern about the application of antitrust in 
network industries.23  In industries with significant network externalities, under 
conditions of incompatibility between competing platforms, monopoly may maximize 
social surplus.  When strong network effects are present, a very large market share of one 
platform creates significant network benefits for this platform which contribute to large 
consumers’ and producers’ surpluses.  It is possible to have situations where a breakup of 
a monopoly into two competing firms of incompatible standards reduces rather than 
increases social surplus because network externalities benefits are reduced.  This is 
another way of saying that de facto standardization is valuable, even if done by a 
monopolist.24 
 
Seventh, in network industries, the costs of entry may be higher but the rewards of 
success may also be higher compared to non-network industries.  Thus, it is unclear if 
there is going to be less entry in network industries compared to traditional industries.  If 
a requirement for entry is innovation, one can read the previous statement as saying that it 
is unclear if innovation would be more or less intense in network industries.  The 
dynamics of the innovation process in the winner-take-most environment of network 
industries are not sufficiently understood by academic economists so that they could give 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
Note that the addition of the fourth firm onward makes practically no difference in the sales and prices of 
the top three firms. 
 
23  In the Microsoft case, both sides had the chance to address this issue, but failed to do so. 
 
24   Economides & Flyer, supra note 20, show that, in market conditions similar to the ones in the OS 
software market, social welfare (total social surplus) can be higher in monopoly.  The table below, taken 
from this paper, shows profits, consumers’ and total surplus in a market where firms produce incompatible 
products, as the number of competitors  I  increase.  
 
Table 2: Profits, Consumers’ And Total Surplus Among Incompatible Platforms 
 
Total 
number 
of firms  I 
Profits of 
largest firm 
Π1 
Profits of 
second firm 
Π2 
Profits of 
third firm 
Π3 
Total industry 
profits 
ΣIj=1 Πj 
Consumers’ 
surplus 
CS 
Total 
surplus 
TS 
1 0.1481   0.1481 0.148197 0.29629651 
2 0.1097 7.159e-3  0.1168 0.173219 0.29001881 
3 0.1077 5.377e-3 3.508e-4 0.1135 0.175288 0.28878819 
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credible advice on this issue to antitrust authorities.  However, in the last two decades we 
have observed very intense competition in innovative activities in network industries 
financed by capital markets. 
 
Eighth, the existence of an installed base of consumers favors an incumbent.  
However, competitors with significant product advantages or a better pricing strategy can 
overcome the advantage of an installed base.25  Network effects intensify competition, 
and an entrant with a significantly better product can unseat the incumbent.  In network 
industries, we often observe Schumpeterian races for market dominance.  This is a 
consequence of the winner-take-most natural equilibrium combined with the high 
intensity of competition that network externalities imply. 
 
4. The Allegations 
 
On May 18, 1998, the United States Department of Justice, and the Attorneys 
General of 20 States26 and the District of Columbia sued Microsoft. The main allegations 
were: 
 
1. Microsoft illegally monopolized the market for operating systems (“OSs”) for 
personal computers (“PCs”) under § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act; 
 
2. Microsoft had anti-competitive contractual arrangements with various vendors of 
related goods, such as with computer manufacturers (“OEMs”) and Internet 
Service Providers (“ISPs”), and had taken other actions to preserve and enhance 
its monopoly; that these contractual arrangements and other actions were illegal 
under §2 of the  Sherman Antitrust Act; 
 
3. Microsoft illegally attempted to monopolize the market for Internet browsers (but 
failed to succeed), an act that is illegal under § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act; 
 
4. Microsoft bundled anti-competitively its Internet browser, IE, the Microsoft 
Internet browser, with its Windows operating systems; that this is illegal under §1 
of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
 
                                                          
25  A clear example of this is the win of VHS over Beta in the United States consumer video 
recorders market.  Beta was first to market and had a significant installed base in the five years of the 
coexistence of the two competing standards.  However, because VHS (i) introduced earlier a recording tape 
of longer duration; (ii) used wide and inexpensive licensing of its technology; and (iii) its licensees had a 
much wider distribution system, VHS emerged as the winner, and Sony stopped selling Beta recorders to 
the US consumer market. 
 
26  The plaintiff States were California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, West Virginia and Wisconsin.  Originally South Carolina was part of the 
lawsuit but dropped out of the case soon after the acquisition of Netscape by America Online (“AOL”) and 
Sun Microsystems (“Sun”) stating that this acquisition has eliminated any anti-competitive concerns. 
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5. Microsoft’s Defense 
 
Microsoft’s defense was as follows.  First, Microsoft argued that the law was on 
its side since the court of appeals had ruled on June 23, 1998 that Microsoft can legally 
add new features and functions to Windows.  Therefore Microsoft argued that it was legal 
to add IE’s functionality to Windows, and it had done nothing wrong by integrating IE in 
Windows.  
 
Second, Microsoft argued that it was just competing hard against Netscape, that 
such competition was welfare-enhancing, and that it did not commit any anti-competitive 
acts. 
 
Third, Microsoft argued that it did not have monopoly power in the operating 
systems market.   
 
Fourth, Microsoft argued that competition in the software sector was intense and 
that its leadership position could be replaced at any time by a new competitor or entrant.  
Although this seems to have been a deeply held belief of Microsoft’s management (as 
revealed by the internal e-mails), its economics expert witness failed to convincingly 
articulate this Schumpeterian view in the context of an antitrust defense. 
 
Fifth, Microsoft argued that it is a leader in software innovation and that it has 
enhanced rather than hobbled the innovation process. 
 
Sixth, Microsoft argued that consumers have benefited from its actions rather than 
been harmed by them.  Microsoft claimed direct consumer benefits from its low pricing 
of the operating system, the zero pricing of its Internet browser, and from its 
enhancement and acceleration of the innovation process.  Microsoft also argued (rather 
ineffectively) that consumers benefit from the de facto standardization that its large 
market share brought to the operating systems market. 
 
6. Antitrust Law 
 
The analysis of DOJ’s allegations and Microsoft’s defenses requires an 
examination of antitrust law as it currently applies in the United States, the facts of the 
case, and a synthesis that will define the extent of the violations of the law.  We start with 
the examination of antitrust law as it applies to this case. 
 
We review the antitrust law in the areas that apply to the Microsoft case.  Section 
2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states: 
 
“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall 
be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished 
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by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, 
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said 
punishments, in the discretion of the court.” 
   
The U.S. antitrust law, as presently interpreted, implies that “monopolization” 
under § 2 of the Sherman Act is illegal if the offender took anti-competitive actions to 
acquire, preserve, or enhance its monopoly.  For “monopolization,” plaintiffs have to 
prove that the defendant: 
 
1. Possessed market power; and 
2. willfully acquired or maintained this monopoly power as distinguished from 
acquisition through a superior product, business acumen, or historical accident. 
 
Therefore, contrary to popular belief, for monopolization to be illegal under U.S. antitrust 
law, it is not sufficient for a company to “monopolize” a market in the sense of 
possessing a very large market share, even a market share of 100%. 
 
U.S. antitrust law, as presently interpreted, implies that “attempting to 
monopolize” is illegal under § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act if the specific actions taken 
have anti-competitive consequences.  For example, bundling, and, more generally, price 
discrimination could be illegal if they have anti-competitive consequences.  Similarly, 
exclusionary contracts (which restrict distribution or production) could be illegal if they 
have anti-competitive effects. 
 
To prove “attempting to monopolize” (under Sherman Act § 2), plaintiffs have to 
prove that the defendant: 
 
1. Engaged in predatory or anti-competitive conduct 
2. with specific intent to monopolize 
3. and that there was a “dangerous probability” that the defendant would succeed in 
achieving monopoly power. 
 
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states:   
 
“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who 
shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby 
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction 
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a 
corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not 
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the 
court.” 
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Thus, unreasonable “restraint of competition” is illegal under §1 of the Sherman Act; this 
may include tying of products or other exclusive arrangements.   
 
 It has generally been accepted in the application of antitrust law in the United 
States that anticompetitive acts harm consumers.  Consumer harm or attempted harm is 
necessary for an antitrust violation.  The affected consumer group may be present or 
future.  Consumers may lose directly from high prices or indirectly through a limitation 
of choices of variety and quality or by a retardation of the innovation process.  But 
without consumer victims or prospective likely victims, present or future, it is extremely 
hard to prove that an antitrust violation exists. 
 
7. The Judge’s “Findings Of Fact” And “Conclusions Of Law” 
 
The U.S. District Court’s “findings of fact” (November 1999) and “conclusions of 
law” (April 2000) find for the plaintiffs (U.S. Department of Justice and 19 States) in 
almost all the allegations against Microsoft.  In particular, Judge Penfield Jackson found: 
  
1. The relevant antitrust market is the PC operating systems market for Intel-
compatible computers. 
2. Microsoft has a monopoly in this market “where it enjoys a large and stable 
market share.” 
3. Microsoft’s monopoly is protected by the “applications barrier to entry,” which 
the judge defines as the availability of an abundance of applications running 
Windows. 
4. Microsoft used its monopoly power in the PC operating systems market to 
exclude rivals and harm competitors. 
5. Microsoft hobbled the innovation process. 
6. Microsoft’s actions harmed consumers. 
7. Various Microsoft contracts had anti-competitive implications, but Microsoft is 
not guilty of anti-competitive exclusive dealing contracts hindering the 
distribution of Netscape Navigator. 
 
 
8. On Monopolization Of The Operating Systems Market 
a. Market Definition 
 
The definition of a market for antitrust purposes is crucial for the determination of 
liability.  Traditionally, an antitrust market definition is based on substitution 
considerations.  To define the market one has to examine the product.  Windows was sold 
to OEMs and users as an operating system on which they could run software applications.  
Windows also contained a variety of functions that were provided free of charge to 
independent software vendors (“ISVs”) so that they would find it easier, cheaper, and 
faster to create applications for Windows.  Microsoft sold to ISVs various tools so that 
they would utilize these functions of Windows, and provided a variety of free services to 
ISVs.  Clearly ISVs were subsidized in kind so that they would write applications for 
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Windows.  DOJ and the district court decided to ignore the market relationship between 
ISVs and Microsoft and to focus exclusively on the sale of Windows to OEMs.   
 
DOJ proposed and the district court judge agreed that the relevant antitrust market 
was the market for operating systems for personal computers that are based on an Intel-
compatible Central Processing Unit (“CPU”).  In this respect, the judge took a rather 
narrow and static view of the market.  It is clear that consumers demand applications 
services from personal computers and would be willing to switch their purchases to non-
Intel-compatible PCs if these computers were offered with similar applications as Intel-
based PCs and at attractive prices.  Thus, non-Intel-compatible computers, operating 
systems and software are substitutes for Intel-compatible computers, operating systems 
and software.  If one takes a static view and considers the software applications written 
for each computer and operating system as given and unchanging (as the judge did), then 
there is no close substitute for Windows that can run as many applications as Windows 
does.  In this static view, all substitutes for Windows are much less valuable because they 
can run so few applications compared to Windows.  In a more dynamic view, if new 
software applications can be written for an operating system (or old ones originally 
written for other operating systems “ported to” it), an operating system can easily have 
close substitutes.   
 
The dynamic view of market definition invites an examination of the incentives  
that ISVs have to create such applications.  Their incentives are not just defined by the 
price of the operating system to OEMs and final consumers, and by the number of units 
that the operating system is expected to sell over the lifetime of their applications.  ISVs 
use functions that are embedded in an operating system or platform to perform certain 
operations that are necessary for their applications.  The more such functions are 
available in an operating system, and the easier they are to access, the more likely it is for 
an ISV to write an application for the OS.  Thus, the availability, abundance, and ease of 
use of embedded functions in the operating system that can be utilized by an ISV needs to 
be calibrated in order to define the extent of the market in the dynamic view of market 
definition.   
 
Early in the trial, Microsoft argued that the concept of market definition for 
antitrust purposes was inappropriate for the dynamic setting of software markets.  This 
position was not very well articulated, and hardly appropriate for a district court judge 
who was very unlikely to subscribe to a major revision to traditional application of 
antitrust law.  Later in the trial, Microsoft argued through its economic witness that 
platforms rather than operating systems were the appropriate domain for antitrust 
analysis, stressing the fact that functions embedded in platforms are used by ISVs to cut 
their costs of writing applications.  However, a full and coherent view of a dynamic 
market definition was never presented. 
 
b. Barriers To Entry 
  
A crucial tenet of DOJ’s and the district court’s argument on monopolization was 
that there are significant barriers to entry in the market for operating systems for personal 
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computers.  Barriers to entry are asymmetric costs that entrants incur but are not incurred 
by incumbents.  Software has a very large fixed cost and a very low (almost zero) 
marginal cost.  The fixed cost required to create an operating system could create a 
barrier to entry to the extent that it is sunk by the incumbent(s), while it has to be paid by 
an entrant in the current period.  However, this barrier to entry is not very significant, 
given the size of the market.   
 
The main barrier to entry could be created by the abundance of applications that 
run on Windows.  It is estimated that Windows runs 70,000 applications, while the 
Macintosh and the Linux operating systems run far fewer applications.  Currently, there 
are also applications that run on servers connected with the World Wide Web and are 
essentially independent of the operating system  (Windows, Mac, Linux, etc.) of the 
client.  The number of applications that can be run on an operating system can be thought 
of as a quality index.  What determines the existence and the extent of the “applications 
barrier to entry” is the extent that costs incurred today by entrants are already sunk by the 
incumbent.  The fact that an industry has a high fixed cost or requires investment to 
induce others to create complementary goods, by itself is not enough to conclude that 
there are barriers to entry.  To judge whether barriers to entry exist, one has to examine if, 
in the relevant time frame, the entrants are facing asymmetrically higher costs than the 
incumbent(s). 
 
It is clear that, early in its history, Microsoft understood the importance of an 
abundance of applications for its operating systems.  To achieve this, Microsoft provided 
various inducements to independent applications developers to write applications for its 
operating systems.  A key inducement for independent applications developers has been 
the availability of functions in Windows that are useful for applications developers.  For 
example, Windows and other operating systems include programming code that makes it 
easy for an application to print to any of a large number of printers.27  Since this function 
is available in the operating system, applications developers do not have to write their 
own programming code to accomplish this function.  It follows that applications are now 
cheaper and quicker to write. 
 
Microsoft spends considerable resources to attract independent software 
developers to write for its operating system and to include in the operating system a 
variety of functions that they find useful.  It is clear that the abundance of applications for 
Windows makes Windows more valuable, and therefore increases Microsoft’s potential 
profits.  This is clearly a pro-competitive reason for Microsoft to invest in resources to 
attract independent software developers.  Given the same number of competitors in the 
operating systems market, a firm enhances its competitive position by investing resources 
in order to attract applications to its operating system.  At the same time, such an increase 
in the number of applications available for an operating system makes it very difficult for 
new entrants to profitably enter and survive.  Thus, increasing the number of applications 
available for an operating system, although it may have a purely competitive justification, 
                                                          
27  This function was not available in DOS.  Thus, each application written for DOS had to include 
large numbers printer drivers that made sure that the application would be able to print on users’ printers.  
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both increases the cost of  entry in the operating systems market, and creates the potential 
for anti-competitive exploitation.   
 
On the other hand, to the extent that the incumbent is currently spending 
resources to attract applications to its operating system, the difference between the costs 
faced by the incumbent and a potential entrant is reduced, and therefore barriers to entry 
are reduced.  Thus, the existence, extent, and importance of an “applications barrier to 
entry” depends on an empirical examination of the extent to which Microsoft spends 
resources in the current time frame to attract applications to Windows, and the extent to 
which Microsoft has already sunk such costs in past time periods.  Such an examination 
was not performed by the district court. 
 
c. Existence Of Market Power And Pricing Of The Operating System 
 
The judge ruled that Microsoft has monopoly power in the OS market for Intel-
compatible PCs.   In antitrust, it is generally understood that a firm has monopoly power 
when it has the sustained ability to control price or exclude competitors.  The existence of 
significant barriers to entry and the very high market share of Microsoft in the operating 
systems market gave indications that Microsoft had monopoly power.  But there was also 
a very strong indication to the contrary.  Microsoft priced its operating system to Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (“OEMs”) at an average price of $40-60, a ridiculously low 
price compared to the static monopoly price.28  Microsoft’s economic witness showed 
that the static monopoly price was about $1,800, a large multiple of Microsoft’s actual 
price.29  At first blush, it seems that Microsoft could not possibly have monopoly power 
in OSs when its OS price is about 3% of the monopoly price.   
                                                          
28  It is very likely that the marginal price for the last unit sold to the same OEM was extremely low 
since the 1995 consent decree allowed Microsoft to have quantity discounts but barred it from zero 
marginal cost pricing. 
 
29  The derivation of the monopoly price for Windows follows.  Let  pH  be the price of the PC 
hardware (everything except Windows) and let  pW  be the price of Windows.  Assume that Windows is 
installed on all PCs, i.e., that Microsoft has 100% market share.  Since hardware and software are 
combined in a ratio of 1:1, the demand of a PC with Windows is D(pH + pW).  Profits of Microsoft from 
Windows sales are: 
 
ΠW = pW D(pH + pW) - FW 
 
where  FW  is the fixed cost of developing Windows, and the marginal cost is negligible.  Maximizing  ΠW  
implies marginal revenue equals marginal cost, i.e.,  
 
D(pH + pW) + pW dD/dpW = 0  ⇔  1 + [pW /(pH + pW)][(pH + pW)/D][dD/dpW] = 0  ⇔  pW /(pH + pW) = 1/|ε|, 
 
or equivalently, the monopoly price of Windows is 
 
pW = pH/(|ε| - 1), 
 
where  |ε| = -[(pH + pW)/D]/[dD/dpW]  is the market elasticity of demand for PCs with Windows.  If one 
assumes that the average price of PC hardware is $1,800 and the elasticity is  |ε| = 2, the monopoly price of 
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Understanding and explaining the very low price of Windows is important for 
understanding what Microsoft’s competitive position was and how Microsoft thought of 
it.  Plaintiffs failed to explain Microsoft’s pricing by either assuming it away or giving 
spurious explanations.  First, the government claimed that pricing significantly above 
marginal cost was evidence of monopoly power, and that the discrepancy between actual 
and theoretical monopoly price did not matter.  But, any software is priced significantly 
above marginal cost since marginal cost is zero, and the government has not yet sued 
other software manufacturers on these grounds.  Second, the government’s economic 
witnesses claimed that the static monopoly model of the plaintiffs did not apply, but 
offered no alternative model that could explain the difference between the actual price 
and the monopoly price of the static model.  Third, the government claimed that a large 
market elasticity and revenues from complementary goods were sufficient to justify that 
the actual price was equal to the monopoly price.  But the required elasticities are very 
large and inconsistent with the price to cost margins of hardware manufacturers.30 
 
Why was the price of Windows low?  For the early periods of each operating 
system, one expects that the existence of network effects would prompt Microsoft to 
charge a low price so that each platform becomes accepted by independent software 
developers as well as users and the bandwagon gets rolling.  This network-effects-based 
theory does not explain why Microsoft did not increase the prices of each generation of 
operating systems as each one matured.  It also does not explain why Microsoft did not 
increase significantly its price of Windows as it doubled its market share in the past four 
years.   
 
A variation of the network effects-induced low price theory gives a predatory 
flavor to Microsoft’s strategy.  In this view, Microsoft priced low to hook consumers and 
generate network effects, while it planned to increase the price “in the future.”  This 
theory is particularly implausible because Microsoft dominates the PC desktop market 
and has doubled its market share in recent years without increasing the price for 
Windows while expanding its functionality.  How long will Microsoft wait until it 
increases the price of Windows?  Some even claim that in a network industry, a firm can 
practice predation without ever increasing the price, but just benefiting in the future from 
the network effects.  But such a strategy is indistinguishable from a truly competitive 
strategy and cannot be considered predatory. 
 
A number of other theories have been proposed to explain Microsoft’s pricing.  
Some claim that the availability of an existing installed base of Windows constrained 
Microsoft’s pricing.  That could have been true if in fact Windows could easily and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Windows is pW = $1,800.  Even if one assumes a much higher elasticity, |ε| = 3, and a much lower average 
price of PC hardware at $1,200, the monopoly price is $600, which is ten to twelve times the price charged 
by Microsoft to OEMs.   
 
30  In the Windows monopoly price formula  pW = pH/(|ε| - 1), if the PC hardware price of $1,800 one 
requires an elasticity of  |ε| = 31 to get a Windows monopoly price of $60.  A PC hardware price of $1,200 
one requires an elasticity of  |ε| = 21 to get a Windows monopoly price of $60.  It is extremely unlikely that 
that the market for PCs exhibits such large market elasticities. 
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legally be uninstalled by users.  But Microsoft’s licensing requirements and the sheer 
complexity of the uninstallation operation make it almost impossible for a user to 
uninstall a Windows operating system that was installed by an OEM and move it to a 
different (presumably new) computer.  So the Windows installed base does not constrain 
Windows pricing.   
 
Others claim that the fact that software is durable constrains Windows pricing.  It 
is true that once Windows runs on an overwhelming market share of PCs, the substitute 
for a new Windows computer is an old Windows computer.  The fact that computers and 
software are both durable makes this true.  But very rapid technological change has 
prompted consumers to buy new computers much faster than traditional obsolescence 
rates would imply.  Even doubling the price of Windows to OEMs would not have 
implied a significant change to the final price of the combined computer and operating 
system.  So, durability of software and durability of computers, although a factor, is 
unlikely to explain the huge difference between the actual price and the static monopoly 
price. 
 
 
                                                          
Still others claim that the low price is implied by the very low cost of pirating 
software.  If that were the case, it would have prompted Microsoft to cut its much higher 
prices of MS-Office and other software, since pirating takes the same effort and has the 
same costs for pirates irrespective of the type of software being pirated.  Moreover, the 
control that Microsoft can exert on piracy of the operating system is much greater than on 
piracy of applications.  Therefore, although piracy could have been more of a problem if 
the OS software was much more expensive, it is unlikely that the price of Windows is 
low because of piracy considerations.  
 
Finally some claim that Microsoft kept the price of Windows low because that 
allowed Microsoft to charge more for complementary goods that it produces, such as the 
Microsoft Office suite.  There are three reasons that make this argument unlikely to be 
correct.  First, Microsoft also produces its most popular products, including the Microsoft 
Office suite, for the Mac.  If Microsoft kept the price of Windows low so that is sold MS-
Office for Windows at a high price, then the price of MS-Office for Macs should have 
been lower than the price of MS-Office for Windows, which is factually incorrect.  
Second, Windows has the ability to collect surplus from the whole assortment of 
applications that run on top of it.  Keeping Windows’ price artificially low would 
subsidize not only MS-Office, but also the whole array of tens of thousands of Windows 
applications that are not produced by Microsoft.  Therefore, even if Microsoft had a 
monopoly in the Office market, keeping the price of Windows low is definitely not the 
optimal way to collect surplus.  Third, even receiving large per unit revenues from 
complementary goods cannot by itself explain the vast difference between the actual and 
the monopoly price of Windows.31 
31  Suppose Microsoft receives net revenue  RC  sold from goods that are complementary to Windows 
for every unit of Windows sold.  Then its profits are  
 
ΠW = (pW + RC)D(pH + pW) - FW . 
 
Then the monopoly price of Windows is  
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Microsoft claimed that its low pricing was due to actual and potential 
competition.  Microsoft’s Internal e-mails point to a real fear that the company would be 
overtaken by the next innovator.  Even if objectively it is difficult to see the big threat 
from potential competitors, it is clear that Microsoft’s executives constantly felt the fear 
of potential competition.  On the pricing of Windows, I am inclined to believe 
Microsoft’s view: Microsoft priced low because of the threat of competition.  This means 
that Microsoft believed that it could not price higher if it were to maintain its market 
position.  In essence, Microsoft pricing reveals that to a large extent its executives 
believed that market conditions (most importantly potential competition) constrained 
higher prices.  
 
d. Exercise Of Market Power 
 
The government claimed that Microsoft’s actions to exclude and marginalize 
Netscape were sufficient to show that Microsoft possessed and exercised its monopoly 
power.  Essentially the government claimed that even if Microsoft did not exercise 
monopoly power in pricing, it was sufficient to show that it exercised it in exclusionary 
actions.  But, most economists would agree that it is much more profitable to exercise 
market power by increasing price than by raising the costs of rivals.32  If Microsoft 
consistently sells at low prices, it loses a large amount of potential profits.  It is very hard 
to make a convincing argument that it is worth sacrificing these profits just to exclude a 
future potential competitor.  After all, even if the potential competitor is successful in 
entering, it could only reduce Microsoft’s future profits, which are worth less today. 
 
The government’s and the judge’s theory was that Microsoft exercised its 
monopoly power by attempting to marginalize Netscape.  The government and the judge 
agree that Microsoft attempted to marginalize Netscape’s browser because Microsoft 
feared that Netscape would become a rival platform to Windows.  According to this point 
of view, once Netscape became such a platform, applications would be written to run on  
Netscape Navigator.  Moreover, the bigger Netscape’s market share, the more likely it is 
that ISVs would write applications for the Netscape platform; it follows that, in DOJ’s 
view, competition in OSs is maximized when Netscape has a monopoly in browsers.   
Since Netscape Navigator could run on many operating systems (not just Windows), 
therefore, from this perspective, Netscape created a threat to Windows.  In this view, all 
actions to aggressively compete with Netscape were just attempts by Microsoft to defend 
its monopoly in PC operating systems.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
pW = pH/(|ε| - 1) - RC . 
 
Even if Microsoft makes a net revenue  RC = $200  from complementary goods from every unit of 
Windows sold, when  pH = $1,800 and  |ε| = 2, the monopoly price of Windows is  pW = $1,600, and when 
pH = $1,200 and  |ε| = 3, the monopoly price of Windows is  pW = $400, vastly above the actual price. 
 
32  The exception is regulated industries where a firm is not free to increase price. 
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This is an interesting theoretical argument, but it has both theoretical and 
empirical deficiencies.  First, in winner-take-most competition, DOJ’s analysis fails to 
distinguish between profit sacrifices to keep out potential rivals and competition where a 
company keeps its prices low in order to win consumer business from actual and potential 
rivals.  Second, although at some point in time Marc Andreesen, Netscape’s CTO, 
claimed that Netscape would create the capabilities of running applications, there was 
never a consistent effort by Netscape to create a comprehensive set of Applications 
Product Interfaces (“APIs”) that would support typical applications that now run under 
Windows.  Moreover, Netscape hardly put sufficient effort and resources in reaching 
independent applications developers to write for such a platform.  So, although 
potentially Netscape could have created such a platform, it was very far away from that 
goal, and the probability of succeeding against the array of Windows applications was 
low. 
 
Third, Netscape, even if successful, is likely to have been limited to Internet-
based applications.  The performance of such applications is dependent on the Internet 
working efficiently and at top speed.  Actual performance would also potentially be 
hampered by excessive loads on the CPUs of servers where the applications would 
actually run.  Essentially the model of Netscape as competitor of operating systems 
required a number of contingencies to be met, and therefore faced a very significant 
uncertainty.  If instead applications were to run on the PC itself (on top of Netscape) they 
would need to interface to some extent with the underlying operating system.  If this 
system were Windows, then it would be unlikely that it would accommodate perfectly its 
direct competitor. 
 
Fourth, Microsoft’s actions clearly could have had competitive justifications.  
Microsoft’s management saw that the Internet was taking off and wanted to have a 
dominant position in it.  
 
DOJ and the district court judge also agreed that Microsoft sabotaged Sun’s Java 
operating language so that Java would not become a “universal language” in the sense 
that applications written for it could be run in any operating system.  Over the years, the 
computer industry has gone through a number of such pipe dream “universal languages.”  
They have all failed for a very simple reason:  a “universal language” cannot be too 
specialized—after all it has to be recognizable by diverse operating systems.  But 
efficiency and speed in program execution requires specialization.  Universal languages 
eventually fail because they get more and more efficient for particular operating systems 
and thereby their universality fails.33 
 
Microsoft created an implementation of Java for Windows that was more efficient 
than the original Java by Sun.  Microsoft’s implementation (that is, Microsoft’s Java 
virtual machine) allowed for all programs written for the original (“pure”) Java to be run 
                                                          
 
33  The fate of human languages is similar.  As each language becomes more efficient for a certain 
group it gets more specialized and cannot easily be understood by the rest of the world. 
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on it.  Thus, it preserved backward compatibility with the original Java that ran on all 
operating systems.  Because of that, Microsoft’s actions were not anti-competitive.  
Microsoft claims that Sun’s non-OS-specific Java language was inefficient and slow, and 
that Microsoft improved it.  This is a reasonable pro-competitive justification for 
Microsoft’s actions.  The fact that Microsoft’s Java implementation also runs programs 
that do not run in other Java implementations is not cause for anti-competitive concern, 
especially since Microsoft has published the function calls its Java makes to Windows.  
Competing operating systems could implement these calls.34 
 
e. A Novel Theory of Predation 
 
 A key economic witness of DOJ, Professor Frank Fisher of MIT, proposed in pre-
trial filings and supported during the trial a novel theory of predation.  The traditional 
theory of predation requires that a product be sold below incremental (or “avoidable”) 
cost for a period of time until competitors are driven out of business; then the monopolist 
increases prices and reaps its monopoly profit.35  Instead Professor Fisher calls an action 
predatory if it would not have been profitable (and therefore not undertaken) in the long 
run unless the predator was taking into consideration profits arising out of the negative 
impact of the practice on competition.   
 
Specifically Professor Fisher’s standard (from pre-filed testimony in the 
Microsoft case and from the cross-examination of Professor Fisher) is that an action is 
anti-competitive when such an action “would not be profit maximizing except for the 
monopoly rents earned or protected by the action.”  In a comment to my earlier criticism 
of this predation theory, Professor Fisher36 augmented his definition/rule (“new Fisher 
rule” thereafter) of an anti-competitive act as one that “involves a deliberate sacrifice of 
profits in order to gain or protect monopoly rents as opposed to gaining of rents through 
superior skill, foresight, and industry,” essentially adding the part “as opposed to the 
gaining of rents through superior skill, foresight, and industry.”  
 
According to this definition of predation, it can occur even when the predator sets 
a price above incremental cost, or even above average unit cost.37  All that is required for 
predation, according to Professor Fisher, is for a company to take some (presumably very 
aggressive) action that would not be rewarding unless competitors are hurt.  If this 
                                                          
34  This discussion is limited to antitrust considerations and does not discuss the contractual dispute 
between Microsoft and Sun. 
 
35  See, e.g., Phillip Areeda &  Louis Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis 512, 514 (Aspen L.& Bus. 1997). 
 
36  See Fisher Innovative Industries and Antitrust: Implications of the Microsoft Case, J. Indus., 
Competition and Trade: From Theory to Policy (2001). 
 
37  Keep in mind that software has a very low (almost zero) incremental cost and a decreasing average 
(unit) cost that is always higher than incremental cost. 
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definition is to be adopted, a large array of actions that are normal business practices and 
which benefit consumers are going to be characterized as predatory and therefore illegal. 
 
In antitrust economics, it is widely believed that rules should be fashioned to 
maximize social surplus.  The Fisher rule fails to do so, as I show below.  It creates an 
artificial cushion of profits.  If an aggressive competitor dares to take away some of these 
profits, he is named a predator.  Moreover, since the profit cushion is created without 
regard to cost, it can be at any status quo level.  Instead of promoting competition and 
efficiency, the Fisher predation theory could protect slack and monopoly rents.  As such, 
it would appear that the judge erred to the extent that he based his Microsoft ruling on 
this incorrect theory.  
 
 To better understand Professor Fisher’s definition of predation, consider the 
following example.  Suppose that in a two-firm industry, firm 1 has constant average unit 
cost equal of $10, while firm 2 has constant average unit cost of $15.  An 
“accommodation strategy” of firm 1 would be to charge a price above $15 (say $16), so 
that the market is shared between firms 1 and 2.  Suppose that firm 1 plays an “aggressive 
strategy” and charges a unit price of $14.  Such an action results in a profit for firm 1 of 
$4 for every unit sold in the market.  These profits are likely to be higher than the profits 
firm 1 would have received in the accommodation strategy of $16.  The accommodation 
strategy gives a profit of $6 per unit sold by firm 1 and, since firm 1 sells only half the 
output, its profit is $3 for every unit sold in the market.  If the market is not extremely 
elastic, firm 1 makes more profits if it uses the aggressive strategy, which drives firm 2 
out of business.  Applying Professor Fisher’s predation definition, firm 1 is a predator 
because its aggressive action increased its monopoly rent.  Moreover, in comparison with 
the “accommodation strategy,” the aggressive strategy would have not been taken if it 
were not trying to increase its monopoly rent. 
 
 If the “aggressive strategy” is considered predatory and therefore illegal according 
to Professor Fisher’s criterion and firm 1 uses the “accommodation strategy” instead, 
total and consumers’ surplus will decrease.  Consumers will face a higher price of $16 
rather than $14 and will therefore be worse off.  Moreover, firm 2 will be producing half 
the units sold at a cost that is higher by $5 than the most efficient production cost, thereby 
reducing total surplus.  It is evident that application of Professor Fisher’s predation 
criterion can result in lower consumers’ and total market benefits (total surplus).  
Moreover, the application of this criterion shields the less efficient firm from competition 
and guarantees its rents. 
 
Additionally, the Fisher rule is vague and hard to implement.  To implement this 
rule, the antitrust authority, a judge, or a jury need to know what monopoly profits would 
have existed if the act that may be characterized as anti-competitive were not taken, and 
the extent that this particular act has affected monopoly profits.  This is a task of 
enormous difficulty and uncertainty.  The judge will have to be able to calculate the 
profits that would have been realized in a hypothetical situation in which the particular 
act (that may be possibly characterized as anti-competitive) were not taken, compare 
them with the present situation where the act was taken, and conclude that profits were 
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lost as a consequence of taking the particular act.  This requires a calculation of the firm’s 
profits in the long run when the act is taken and profits in the long run when the action is 
not taken.  And, a proper comparison would require a calculation of the firm’s profits in 
the long run when, having not taken the act that may be characterized as anti-competitive, 
the firm implemented instead other strategies.  That is, if one makes long run maximum 
profits comparisons, and truly wants to implement Fisher’s rule, one needs to calculate 
the maximized profits in the absence of the act that may be characterized as anti-
competitive.  This requires calculating profits where the firm has implemented other 
strategies not used at present.38 
 
This task is extremely difficult because it requires that the judge and jury 
understand the long run optimization strategy of the firm.  Economists have a multitude 
of oligopoly models and cannot agree on which is best.  It may be almost impossible for 
the court to correctly and with high confidence make the calculations required by the 
Fisher rules.  In the Microsoft case, for example, both sides failed to adequately explain 
the long run profit maximization model that Microsoft actually used to price Windows 
over a long period of time, before as well as after the alleged anti-competitive actions.  
One wonders how the courts would possibly be able to make the additional hypothetical 
calculations required for the implementation of the Fisher rule.  What oligopoly model 
would the court adopt?  What other strategies would the court expect to have been 
implemented in the absence of the act that may be characterized as anti-competitive?  
What equilibrium paths would the court expect to be followed in the long run?  These are 
very hard questions that are unlikely to be answered in a satisfactory way given our 
present knowledge of economics.  In practice, the Fisher rule would constrain dominant 
firms from aggressive pricing, investment, and innovation behavior that would be seen, at 
least by some economists, as fitting exactly the requirements of anti-competitive behavior 
of the Fisher rule.  If such aggressive behavior is prevented or punished, the ultimate 
losers are current and future consumers. 
 
Moreover, the additional caveat of the new Fisher rule means that the present 
versus hypothetical analysis described above has to be done with reference to monopoly 
rents over and above those that arise out of “superior skill, foresight, and industry.”  So, 
two types of monopoly rents have to be calculated in each case of the hypothetical 
equilibrium (where the action is not taken but possibly other hypothetical actions are 
taken) and of the actual equilibrium (where the action was taken).  The judge and jury 
now have the additional burden to ascertain the extent that present as well as hypothetical 
rents are monopoly rents not arising out of “superior skill, foresight, and industry.”  This 
makes their task even more difficult. 
 
Based on these considerations, the Areeda predation rule is vastly superior 
because it does not require the court to make the very difficult profit maximization 
calculations described above, some of which are by their nature speculative because they 
require an analysis of firm behavior in hypothetical situations.  Instead, the Areeda rule is 
                                                          
38  Such strategies might not have been implemented because, for example, they were substitutes to 
the act that may be characterized as anti-competitive, or were in conflict with it.   
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based on a comparison of incremental cost and price, which are much easier to determine 
than what is required under the Fisher rule.   
 
There is a second important deficiency of the new Fisher rule that also applies to 
the old one: the rule may mischaracterize pro-competitive behavior as predatory and anti-
competitive.  Although some anti-competitive actions have the features described by the 
Fisher rule, so do many pro-competitive actions.  That is, every action that obeys the 
Fisher rule is not anti-competitive.  There are many pro-competitive actions that firms 
take where they sacrifice profits for some time in order to gain profits in the long run.  
For example, suppose that, in an industry with network effects, a firm sells a product at a 
low price (but above incremental as well as break-even average cost), expecting to attract 
customers to its product of proprietary design.  Moreover, suppose that as new customers 
come to market, the firm continues to use this strategy and does not increase the price 
over an extended period of time.  As a consequence, the firm’s market share increases to 
the point that this firm is considered dominant.  This strategy may have purely pro-
competitive causes but it fits well in the Fisher definition of anti-competitive acts.  A 
court implementing the Fisher rule could find such a firm liable of predation and thus 
eliminate the benefits to consumers of the pro-competitive strategy. 
 
Finally, the Fisher rule does not require that the lost monopoly rents be eventually 
recovered.  The courts are urged to characterize acts that fit the Fisher rule as predatory 
and to take action against firms exhibiting such behavior typically before the final act of 
recovery of profits occurs, and therefore without knowledge or certainty that profit 
recovery will occur.  Thus, the Fisher rule does not wait for the final act (recovery of lost 
rents) that could distinguish between pro-competitive and anti-competitive acts.  It rushes 
to judgment before a certainty of an anti-competitive act.  Professor Fisher is concerned 
that unless antitrust authorities act before consumers are harmed, “corrective action might 
come too late.”  But, if we follow Professor Fisher’s rule, we can rely only on faith in the 
correctness and applicability of an oligopoly model to reach the conclusion that 
consumers will be harmed at some time in the future.  There will be no certainty.  And, in 
most hypothetical situations, given the multitude of oligopoly models with contradictory 
results, there cannot even be a consensus of a high probability that consumers will be hurt 
in the future.  Thus, the Fisher rule will just create one more battle ground among 
economic consultants, some stating that it is inevitable that consumers will be hurt in the 
future, while others seeing only pro-competitive behavior.  Ultimately, if this rule is 
adopted, the big winners will be economic consultants.  The big losers will be companies 
that take aggressive competitive actions, which will regularly be sued on predatory 
grounds by their less aggressive (or less efficient) rivals.  In the long run, if the rule is 
widely adopted, repeated antitrust intervention will coach aggressive competitors not to 
be  aggressive and to instead accommodate competitors, resulting in very significant 
losses to consumers. 
 
9. On Tying Of Windows With Internet Explorer 
 
As we have seen, the district court ruled that Microsoft had monopoly power in 
the operating systems market.  Judge Jackson further ruled that the Internet browser 
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market was separate from the market for operating systems, and that technological and 
contractual tying of Internet Explorer with Windows raised prices and hurt consumers.  
The judge ruled that consumers do not want IE even free of charge because it burdens the 
OS with memory and overhead requirements, and it consumes a significant amount of 
hard disk space.   
 
There is a major contradiction in the district court’s decision.  Under the  § 2 
analysis, browsers are in the same market as operating systems, but in the Sherman §1 
part of the case, browsers and operating systems are in different markets.  On the one 
hand, in the tying part of the case, the judge ruled that Internet browsers are in a separate 
market from  PC operating systems.  On the other hand, in the monopolization part of the 
case, the judge ruled that Microsoft attempted to marginalize the Netscape browser to 
defend its Windows monopoly because the Netscape browser was (or was becoming) a 
close substitute for Windows.  If Internet browsers are in a separate market from the 
operating systems market, then Microsoft’s actions in the browser market in the 
monopolization part of the case cannot be interpreted as defending Microsoft’s 
monopoly.  If instead the browser is in the same market as Windows, there cannot be 
illegal tying. 
 
 Microsoft claimed that IE was giving crucial functionality to its operating system 
and had every right to include it in Windows under the terms of the 1995 consent decree, 
which allowed addition of functions and features to Windows.  Although this is a legal 
matter, I believe that the consent decree’s language is plain enough to allow one to 
conclude that Microsoft’s view is correct.   
 
 But why did Microsoft produce a browser and why did it then give it away?  
Essentially the question is: what is the appropriate behavior in a complementary goods 
market for a firm that has a dominant position in one market?  That is, does it make sense 
from a competitive point of view that Microsoft was giving away the browser at no 
charge, or was it an anti-competitive act?  To understand this, we first outline some 
thoughts about extracting value from complementary goods chains, where one good has 
close complements that are used in conjunction with it.39 
 
First, a firm in one market is better off and can extract more value when the 
complementary markets in which it does not participate are more competitive.  
Conversely, the more monopolized a market is, the less value remains for the 
complementary markets.  Second, keep in mind that value can be extracted only once 
from the chain of components.  If a firm can monopolize one component, and all other 
complementary component markets are perfectly competitive, the firm gains nothing by 
attempting to monopolize the complementary component markets.  The value of a good 
or service cannot be extracted more than once, no matter how many components the good 
                                                          
 
39  See Nicholas Economides, Competition and Vertical Integration in the Computing Industry, in  
Competition, Innovation, and the Microsoft Monopoly: Antitrust in the Digital Marketplace, Jeffrey A. 
Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard (eds.), Kluwer Acad. Publishers 1999, (visited Apr.23, 2001), at 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/98-11.pdf.  
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is broken into.  But, a firm that monopolizes a component has an incentive to enter and 
compete hard in a market for a complementary component if the complementary 
component market is not perfectly competitive, because by entering such a market, the 
firm can capture rents that it was losing from its original market.  Third, more generally, 
a firm that participates in a market that is not perfectly competitive has a stronger 
incentive to enter a (not perfectly competitive) market for a complementary component 
than a firm that does not participate in any other market.  Otherwise put, when 
complementary component markets are not perfectly competitive, there are strong 
incentives for the same firms to enter more than one of these markets.  Fourth, when a 
component, say component A,  is used together with many other complementary 
components, say B1, ..., Bn, to produce  n  composite goods of varying market values, 
competitors in the market for A will tend to enter the markets for the complementary 
components that, in combination with A, have the highest market value.   
 
 The entry of Microsoft in the browser market can be seen in the context of 
competition and multi-market participation in markets for complementary components.  
As long as the market for browsers was competitive and was shared by a number of 
browsers, and as long as the Internet was a small academic market, Microsoft had no 
significant business interest in it.  When the browser market became dominated by 
Netscape, and, simultaneously, the Internet market appeared to be significantly larger, 
Microsoft integrated browser features in Windows and significantly improved its 
browser.  Again, there were two reasons for this.  First, Netscape had a dominant position 
in the browser market, thereby taking away from Microsoft’s operating system profits to 
the extent that Windows was used together with the Navigator.  Second, as the markets 
for Internet applications and electronic commerce exploded, the potential loss to 
Microsoft from not having a top browser increased significantly.  These reasons were 
sufficient to drive Microsoft to produce a browser.   
 
Was the free distribution of IE anti-competitive?  Clearly, Microsoft had a pro-
competitive incentive to freely distribute IE since that would stimulate demand for the 
Windows platform.  Were there anti-competitive effects?  If one assumes (as DOJ does in 
the tying part of the case) that the two markets (operating systems and browsers) are 
separate and therefore tying occurred, the crucial question is whether tying was anti-
competitive.  In particular, was the incremental increase in the price of Windows when IE 
was bundled with it larger than the price increase justified by the value of functionality 
that IE added?  This is the test that the Jackson court should have conducted, and it failed 
to do so.  My view is that it is very hard to prove that a quality-adjusted new version of 
Windows without IE would not have had a higher hedonic price than old Windows.  That 
is, a modest increase in the market price of Windows was likely to be justified by the 
enhancement of features of Windows even without the inclusion of IE.  Thus, if the court 
had performed this test, I believe it is likely that it would have found that adding IE 
functionality to new versions of Windows and distributing IE free of charge for older 
versions of Windows and for other operating systems did not harm consumers.   
 
10. On Attempting To Monopolize The Browser Market 
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The district court judge found that Microsoft lost money while trying to gain 
market share from Netscape, in its attempt to monopolize the browser market by 
leveraging its monopoly of the OS market.  The judge also found that Microsoft failed in 
this attempt. 
 
It is well understood that the potential surplus of a consumer for a unit of a good 
can only be extracted once.  If Microsoft is able to extract the surplus of a consumer that 
buys an Internet browser through Windows, it has no incentive to try to monopolize the 
market for browsers, as long as the market for browsers is competitive.  To the extent that 
the market for browsers is monopolized, it can take away from the surplus appropriated 
by Windows, and then Microsoft may have an incentive to expand its market share in 
browsers.  There is significant evidence that the market for browsers was originally 
monopolized by Netscape.  Then the inroad of Microsoft into browsers replaced a 
monopoly with duopoly.  And, it brought the price to zero and intensified research and 
development in browsers to the great benefit of consumers.  It is quite ironic that, 
although the inroad of Microsoft into browsers was greatly beneficial to consumers and 
broke the Netscape monopoly, the government and the judge found Microsoft’s actions 
anti-competitive. 
 
11. Other Potentially Anti-competitive Arrangements 
 
The court proceeding spent a significant amount of time on potentially anti-
competitive actions of Microsoft in its dealings with buyers, content providers and others.  
An examination of the various arrangements and the facts of each one of them is 
impossible in this article due to of lack of space.  Broadly speaking, the potentially anti-
competitive actions were of three kinds:  
 
1. Contracts with OEMs on the distribution of Netscape and IE, and the lack of 
control by OEMs of the opening screen (“first screen”) of a new PC. 
2. Contracts with ISPs (such as AOL) on the distribution of Netscape and IE 
3. Control by Microsoft or OEMs of “active channels” to be provided to Internet 
Content Providers (such as Disney) 
 
The potentially anti-competitive effects of such contracts have to be judged on a case by 
case basis. 
 
12. Effects On Consumers 
 
In principle, there are three ways that consumers could be hurt by potentially anti-
competitive actions.  First, consumers may be hurt because these actions increase prices.  
Second, consumers may be hurt because these actions may limit their choices in terms of 
variety and quality.  Third, these actions may limit innovative activity, thereby hurting 
future consumers.  Any harm in any of these three dimensions should be evaluated and 
balanced with any benefit of these actions in other dimensions.  It is customary in 
antitrust cases to value the benefits to consumers and balance them with the burden of 
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anti-competitive actions.  The district court failed to do this task.  The court did not 
attempt to quantify the benefits to consumers from giving away Internet Explorer and the 
intensification of competition that resulted.  Also, the court did not try to assign a 
monetary value to the losses to consumers resulting from the anti-competitive actions for 
which it found Microsoft liable. 
 
Consumers have directly benefited from the free distribution of Internet Explorer 
as well as its bundling and tight integration with Windows.  Before Microsoft started to 
seriously compete with Netscape in the Internet browser market, Netscape— essentially 
the sole provider of Internet browser software—charged non-academic users $40-50 to 
use its browser.40  Microsoft, by contrast, gave its Internet browser away.  Netscape 
responded to the introduction of IE version 4 that many held of superior or comparable 
quality to Netscape by giving its browser away as well.  Today, with at least 100 million 
browsers installed in the United States, Microsoft’s actions have created a benefit of at 
least $4 to $5 billion to American consumers.  And, since Microsoft’s actions intensified 
competition, which in turn produced higher quality browsers, they provided further 
benefits to consumers.   
 
The district court judge ruled that the prices of Windows 95 and 98 were too high, 
based on internal Microsoft e-mails that discussed a range of prices considered by the 
company for pricing Windows.  However, consumers may have directly benefited from 
the relatively low price of Windows.  Since the marginal cost of Windows is almost zero, 
clearly Microsoft had a wide range of prices it could have used.  The static monopoly 
price for Windows was thirty to forty times higher.  Microsoft’s operating system, for 
which computer manufacturers pay $40-60 per copy, is cheap compared to the historical 
and current prices of other operating systems.  For example, in the late 1980s, IBM sold 
OS/2 (which ran much fewer applications than Windows) for hundreds of dollars. Some 
Linux packages—essentially add-ons to the free Linux source code – currently sell for up 
to $150, and run far fewer applications than Windows does.  These price discrepancies 
highlight a huge contradiction in the government’s case and in the judge’s findings of 
fact.  If Microsoft were a true malevolent monopoly unconstrained by potential 
competition, it would charge far more for Windows than it does. The annual consumer 
benefits from Windows’ relatively low price may be many billions of dollars. 
 
The district court judge ruled that Microsoft’s action of distributing Internet 
Explorer at no charge “increased [the] general familiarity with the Internet and reduced 
the cost to the public of gaining access to it,” “gave Netscape an incentive to improve 
Navigator’s quality,” and benefited consumers since it “compelled Netscape to stop 
charging for Navigator.”41   On the other hand, the district court judge ruled that 
                                                          
40  Netscape was distributed free of charge to academic and governmental institutions.  Netscape was 
also distributed free of charge to all in its introductory stage. 
 
41  Findings of Fact, United States v. Microsoft, Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ) and State of N.Y. v. 
Microsoft Civil Action No. 98-1233 (TPJ), thereafter (“FOF”).  See Microsoft III, 84 F. Supp 2d at 111. 
(paragraph 408 discussing the effect on consumers of Microsoft efforts to protect the applications barrier to 
entry).  
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consumers were hurt in various ways by Microsoft’s anti-competitive actions.  The judge 
ruled that consumers were hurt42 because they could not get Windows without a browser 
since Microsoft “forced OEMs to ignore consumer demand for a browserless version of 
Windows,” and that the inclusion of Internet Explorer led to “degraded system 
performance, and restricted memory.” 
 
I believe that Judge Jackson erred in ruling that free distribution of IE 
significantly harmed consumers by degrading performance and restricting available 
computer memory.  First, because IE has been integrated into Windows, it is very hard to 
judge how a computer would work without it, how much memory it would use, how 
quickly it would run, etc.  One would have to construct a computer with some other new 
component of the OS taking over the functions that IE performs now in Windows, and 
then test it.  The court failed to do so, and cannot conclusively rule on this issue.  Second, 
the Internet-related tasks of operating systems are in very high demand as the Internet is 
presently in an exponential expansion path.  The number of consumers who have been 
harmed in the way suggested by the judge is likely to be very small, and in an age of 
cheap computers, memory, and hard drive capacity, their losses could not be very large. 
 
Netscape and Internet Explorer ended up being very similar products in terms of 
their functionality.  Most computer magazines rate recent versions of IE above 
Netscape’s.  There does not seem to be any loss in variety or quality by the domination of 
the browser market by IE.  Windows-based computers can run both IE and Navigator 
simultaneously, and users are not forced to choose one to the exclusion of the other.  One 
could use one browser for some tasks and another for others.   
   
The court ignored the issue of compatibility which was probably the most central 
issue in the case.  Backward and forward compatibility is crucial for software markets, 
and, as explained earlier, is the source of network effects.  Microsoft provides de facto 
compatibility through its Windows operating systems.  Compatibility is an important 
benefit to society because it is the source of network effects.  Compatibility and its 
benefits could be quickly eliminated or significantly reduced if Microsoft is broken into 
competing pieces.  Microsoft did not forcefully present to the court the benefits to society 
of its dominant position arising from the de facto compatibility it created and the 
resulting network effects. 
 
Finally on the issue of innovation, economists’ opinions are split on whether 
monopoly or competition would create more innovation.  Economists’ opinions are also 
split on whether vertically integrated or independent companies create more innovation.  
The government’s economic witnesses did not provide any specific theory to support the 
claim that Microsoft was damaging the innovation process.  The theory that general fear 
of Microsoft kept competitors out of the market or without available capital is 
contradicted by the abundant support by financial markets of the successful entry of a 
number of Linux variants.  
 
                                                          
42  See Microsoft III, 84 F. Supp 2d at 111. (Findings of Fact discussion at paragraph 410). 
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13. Remedies 
a. Remedies As Imposed By The District Court 
 
The issue of remedies was from the very beginning the most difficult part of the 
litigation.  Many observers that believed that Microsoft was liable had expressed 
privately great consternation in finding an appropriate remedy.  Given the variety of 
remarks of Judge Jackson during the trial, there was no doubt that the district court would 
have found Microsoft liable.  Even before the trial started, it seemed that the remedies 
determination would be the most crucial and most interesting element of the process.  It 
was widely expected that the remedies phase would be a new full scale trial with 
significant input by economists. 
 
Instead, Judge Jackson decided on remedies in summary fashion without any 
examination of the proposals of all sides.  He was quoted shortly afterwards arguing that 
since the plaintiffs won the liability phase, the plaintiffs should have the right to 
determine the remedies.   
 
In the last week of March 2000, the New York Times published the terms of the 
Microsoft and DOJ negotiations conducted under Judge Posner’s supervision.  The 
published information implied that DOJ and Microsoft were not far from an agreement, 
but that some States that were part of the litigation disagreed with the settlement terms.  
The terms of the final draft of the proposal of DOJ were:43 
 
1. Microsoft would create a pricing schedule that would apply to all buyers, so that 
prices would not be conditioned on other Microsoft products that a buyer buys.  
The schedule would allow for different prices for different quantities. 
2. Microsoft would not be allowed to have exclusive contracts that do not allow the 
other party to use, display, or feature its opponent’s products. 
3. Microsoft would be required to share technical information without 
discrimination among the potential recipients of this information. 
4. Microsoft would be required to disclose the application interfaces (APIs) that link 
applications to Windows. 
5. Microsoft cannot increase the price of old versions of Windows when new 
versions are released.  Microsoft would be forced to sell the old version at a 
constant price for three years after a new release. 
6. Microsoft would produce a Windows version without IE.  Computer 
manufacturers would be allowed to license some part of the Windows code so that 
they could change the opening screen, and choose the default browser 
7. Tying by contract would be prohibited, but Microsoft would be allowed to 
integrate functions, applications, and features in its products.44 
 
                                                          
43  See generally N. Y. Times, Apr. 2, 2000.  See also Brinkley & Lohr, supra note 7, at 286-87.  
 
44  This seems identical to the provision of the 1995 decree which the DOJ claimed at the beginning 
of this lawsuit was not restricting Microsoft enough. 
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This list of conditions seemed a reasonable basis on which a deal with Microsoft 
could be struck.  Since these were the government’s proposals, one expects that the final 
negotiated settlement would have been somewhat less harsh on Microsoft.  It was widely 
reported that some States officials considered these remedies as less harsh than they 
wished for.  These States officials communicated to Judge Posner that they would not 
sign such a deal.  Judge Posner was forced to declare the negotiations a failure. 
 
Given the proposals that the government offered in the negotiations, there was a 
wide expectation that DOJ would demand more or less the same terms in the remedies 
phase.45  Instead, DOJ asked for a much more radical step: a breakup of Microsoft. 
 
The plaintiffs remedies proposal as adopted by the judge imposed a breakup of 
Microsoft into two “Baby Bills,”46 an operating systems company which would inherit all 
the operating systems software, and an “applications” company with all the remaining 
software assets.  Cash and securities holdings of other companies held by Microsoft 
would be split between the resulting entities.  Bill Gates and other officers / shareholders 
of the company would not be allowed to hold executive and ownership positions in both 
of the resulting companies. 
 
The district court ruling also imposed interim conduct restrictions on Microsoft.  
These restrictions, to last three years, from the time of the breakup were: 
 
1. Microsoft would create a pricing schedule that would apply to all buyers, so that 
price would not be conditioned on the sale of other Microsoft products.   
2. Microsoft would not be allowed to have exclusive contracts that do not allow the 
other party to use, display, or feature its opponent’s products. 
3. APIs and other technical information of Windows should be shared with outsiders 
as it is shared within Microsoft. 
4. Microsoft is not allowed to take actions against manufacturers who feature 
competitors’ software. 
5. Microsoft will allow OEMs to alter Windows in significant ways. 
6. Microsoft is not allowed to design Windows to disable or compromise rivals’ 
products. 
 
These conditions are similar but more restrictive than the ones proposed by the 
government in the settlement talks at the end of March 2000.  At that point in time the 
government was satisfied that these restrictions, together with a ban on tying and a 
requirement that Microsoft would produce a version of Windows without IE, were 
                                                          
45  In fact, Professor Harry First who was acting as Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust for the 
State of New York was quoted in the New York Times (Apr. 30, 2000) saying that he and other officials of 
the States were expecting DOJ to propose remedies similar to DOJ’s proposals at the negotiations, and 
were very surprised when Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein informed them a few days before the filing 
that DOJ would propose a breakup.  See also Brinkley & Lohr, supra note 7, at 306-07.  
 
46  This is a word play on “Baby Bells” that came out of AT&T and the first name of the CEO of 
Microsoft, Bill Gates. 
 
 34 CYBER RIGHTS, PROTECTION, AND MARKETS [Vol. 32 
sufficient to settle the case.  DOJ did not produce any significant reason that made it 
change its position.  Moreover, DOJ did not produce any convincing argument that the 
proposed breakup would be more efficient or effective than the conduct restrictions that it 
had proposed earlier. 
 
In arguing for the break-up, the government put forward a number of reasons.  
But, since there was only a summary formal hearing on remedies, there was no chance 
for both the government’s and Microsoft’s cases on remedies to be discussed and 
evaluated.  The government and the judge have stated (formally and informally) the 
following arguments for a breakup: 
 
1. That it considered the repeated violations of antitrust law by Microsoft as an 
indication that Microsoft would not follow any conduct or contractual restrictions; 
in fact, in some informal remarks, government officials believe that they were 
“tricked” by Microsoft in settling the 1995 case with terms that Microsoft was 
able to exploit; 
2. That the lack of remorse by Microsoft’s executives was a clear indication that 
Microsoft “could not be trusted” to implement any other remedy; 
3. That the breakup was a “surgical cut” that would create the least interference with 
business; 
4. AT&T and the rest of the telecommunications industry benefited from AT&T’s 
breakup, and so should Microsoft and the software industry; after all both 
industries have network effects; 
5. The breakup eliminates the incentive for vertical foreclosure; and 
6. The breakup reduces the “applications barrier to entry” since now the applications 
company might write popular Microsoft applications (such as MS-Office) for 
other platforms. 
 
I believe that the government has failed to show that the proposed breakup is the 
appropriate remedy.  DOJ had to show that conduct remedies would not work and it 
failed to do so.  DOJ has not performed the appropriate cost-benefit analysis to show that 
conduct remedies are not sufficient and that a breakup is necessary.  None of the  
affidavits in the remedies phase even approach a discussion on evaluating alternatives.  
As discussed earlier, the government also failed to justify why it was ready to 
compromise a few weeks earlier on behavioral remedies but now it claimed that 
structural remedies were necessary. 
 
The first argument of the government does not stand to reason.  The 1995 case 
was settled with a decree that explicitly stated that Microsoft can include in its operating 
system any additional functionality.  It is reasonable that Microsoft (or any observer, 
including DOJ) would believe, given the 1995 consent decree, that adding browser 
functionality to Windows does not violate the consent decree.  This, of course, does not 
mean that adding such functionality does not violate antitrust law in general, but it puts to 
its death the idea that the government was tricked by Microsoft.  Of course, it stands to 
reason that Microsoft understood much more clearly what the degree said than DOJ since 
Microsoft understood the business better and could predict what functions could be 
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included in the operating system.  However, the fact that companies and antitrust 
enforcers often have an asymmetry of information is very common and expected, and 
cannot be considered a “trick,” or a reason not to enter into agreements between antitrust 
authorities and companies. 
 
The second argument of the plaintiffs makes no sense at all.  Antitrust 
enforcement is not an emotional tug of war in which the egos of either the plaintiffs or 
the defendants need to be satisfied.  The show of remorse or lack thereof by Microsoft 
executives could not possibly define the remedy.  I find it hard to believe that the judge 
would really find a different remedy appropriate if enough Microsoft executives simply 
showed public remorse.  Moreover, Microsoft, like any other defendant, has a right to 
appeal.  Belief that it will prevail on appeal in a civil case is hardly worthy of 
punishment. 
 
The third argument, that the breakup is a surgical cut and therefore will disrupt 
the industry the least is countered by the facts.  A breakup of Microsoft, if it were finally 
ordered at the end of the appeals process, would, practically speaking, eliminate 
Microsoft as a flexible and formidable competitor.  The wholehearted endorsement of the 
breakup by Microsoft’s competitors in the servers and backoffice competitors (who were 
not alleged to have been damaged by the Windows monopoly but will greatly benefit 
from the confusion and disruption created by a Microsoft breakup) is evidence that the 
breakup is one of the most disruptive possible outcomes. 
 
The fourth argument, that since AT&T’s 1982 breakup was successful so would 
Microsoft’s, is incorrect.  AT&T was divided into the long-distance company (AT&T), 
and seven regional operating companies, each of which remained a regulated local 
telecommunications monopoly until 1996.  The destruction of AT&T’s long-distance 
monopoly encouraged competition, which brought sharply lower prices and immense 
consumer benefits.47  There are a number of key differences between the two companies 
and their competitive situations. And these differences make it very likely that a 
Microsoft breakup, besides harming Microsoft, would harm consumers and the computer 
industry.  
 
In 1981, AT&T was a 100-year-old regulated monopoly with many layers of 
management. For historical reasons, the local phone companies within the old AT&T, 
such as New York Telephone, were managed separately from the “long lines” division. 
Thus, it was not difficult to separate the divisions since they functioned on many levels as 
separate companies.  AT&T also had an abundance of managers to help cope with the 
breakup.  By contrast, Microsoft is a young, entrepreneurial company run by very few top 
executives (about 25), and its divisions are very fluid.  While this has made Microsoft 
one of the most efficient and successful companies around, it also means that a break-up 
                                                          
47  At the same time the AT&T breakup did not introduce competition at the local exchange level, 
and the Regional Bell Operating Companies (“RBOCs”) were allowed to monopolize local 
telecommunications services as well as access to long distance services.  The success of competition in 
long distance has been hampered by the continuing monopoly of the local exchange, four years after the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 was supposed to open the local exchange to competition. 
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would pose significant managerial problems and severely reduce the company’s 
flexibility. Finally, AT&T was a regulated utility and regulation guaranteed that the 
companies emerging from the breakup stayed interconnected.  In contrast, the Microsoft 
breakup is likely to lead to incompatibilities and further loss of efficiency. 
 
DOJ’s two-way breakup plan was premised on the hope that an autonomous 
applications company would create a new operating system to compete with Windows. 
But more than 70,000 applications run on Windows, creating what the government calls 
“the applications barrier to entry” in the operating-system market.  However capable the 
new applications company, it still wouldn’t be able to single-handedly create a successful 
rival operating system. Separately, even with a new applications company’s support, 
Microsoft’s biggest operating-system competitor, Linux, is unlikely to become a serious 
desktop threat to Windows. 
 
In my opinion, the breakup as proposed by the government and imposed by the 
district court will have detrimental effects.  First, the breakup is likely to result in higher 
prices.  If DOJ is correct and Microsoft kept its OS prices low so that it can exercise its 
monopoly power in the adjacent browser market, the post-breakup Baby Bill that inherits 
the operating systems will have no incentive to keep the price low.  The OS Baby Bill 
will no longer have the incentive to disadvantage any applications companies.  Thus, if 
DOJ’s theories are correct, the OS Baby Bill will now exercise the monopoly power it 
has and raise the price of the operating system to the detriment of consumers.  If DOJ is 
correct and Microsoft has significant monopoly power because of the “applications 
barrier to entry,” higher prices will be the direct result of the breakup.  Second, as 
explained earlier, the breakup is likely to eliminate the efficiencies that make Microsoft a 
flexible and formidable competitor. 
 
The breakup is likely to temporarily eliminate the incentive for interference from 
OSs to applications and vice versa.  Of course, the same could have been accomplished 
by conduct restrictions without the cost and the disruption of the breakup.  Moreover, the 
district court did not impose permanent restrictions on the post-breakup functions of the 
companies.  The OS and the applications Baby Bills may enter into each other’s business 
soon after the breakup.  It is very likely that a few years after the breakup, one of the 
resulting companies will dominate both markets.   
 
b. Other Remedies Proposals 
 
A number of other remedies proposal have been discussed in the literature, but 
unfortunately were not discussed in the district court’s summary remedies proceedings.  
If the liability conviction is upheld by the court of appeals or the U. S. Supreme Court, it 
is likely that the issue of remedies will be re-opened and a full hearing on remedies may 
take place. 
 
In principle, remedies fall into two broad classes.  First there are those that attack 
the business side of Microsoft by restricting its contracts or splitting the company along 
various lines of business. The second broad class attacks the control over the technology 
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by either forcing Microsoft to release or license the source code, or to disclose 
proprietary information (APIs).  The remedies can also be divided into those that affect 
conduct and those that affect structure.  For example, a restriction on contracts is a 
conduct remedy, while a breakup is a structural remedy. 
 
Provided that the liability conviction is upheld, four alternatives have been 
proposed.  One remedy proposal is even more extreme than the one imposed by the 
judge.  This extreme proposal would break up Microsoft into three identical Baby Bills, 
with each company acquiring the source code of all the programs that Microsoft currently 
sells, and one third of its employees.48  This “horizontal remedy” is sometimes presented 
in combination with the “vertical remedy” imposed by the judge.  In this “hybrid 
remedy,” first Microsoft is broken into two or three companies according to the type of 
program produced, and then the operating systems company is broken into three parts 
creating four of five companies altogether.  
 
Besides the loss of flexibility that any breakup would create, a horizontal or 
hybrid breakup would also produce significant incompatibilities with harmful effects to 
computer users, applications writers, and Microsoft shareholders.  Baby Bills coming out 
of a horizontal or a hybrid breakup will have incentives to create incompatible versions of 
Windows for two reasons.  First, Baby Bills will try to differentiate their operating 
systems to avoid strong competition, leading to small price-cost margins.  This is true 
even in industries without network externalities and has been well established in the 
economics literature on product differentiation.49  Second, Baby Bills will try to make 
their operating systems incompatible with each other in a race to become the dominant 
OS, since the dominant firm receives the lion’s share of profits in a winner-takes-most 
world.  This is established in the network economics literature.50  Differentiating the 
operating systems by Baby Bills would inevitably reduce the range of software that 
would be compatible with each user’s computer.  As a consequence, consumers’ surplus 
would decrease.  The emerging incompatibilities would be a huge headache for both 
independent applications writers and corporate IT departments.  Such incompatibilities 
would also hurt shareholders, since the combined value of the resulting Baby Bills will be 
smaller than that of the original Microsoft. 
 
                                                          
48  See Litan, supra note 21.  
49  See Claude D’Aspremont, Jean Jaskold-Gabszewicz, &  Jacques-Francois Thisse, On Hotelling’s 
Stability in Competition, 47 Econometrica at 1145-50. See also Anver Shaked & John Sutton, 
Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation, 49 Rev. Econ. Stud. at 3-14. See 
Nicholas Economides, The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Revisited, 24 Eur. Econ. Rev. at 
345-368. 
50  See Economides & Flyer, supra note 20, and  Nicholas Economides,  Industry Fragmentation 
After A Microsoft Breakup (2001) (on file with the author); Nicholas Economides, The Microsoft 
Antitrust Case, J. Indus., Competition & Trade: From Theory to Policy (forthcoming Aug. 2001); 
see also Nicholas Economides, The Microsoft Antitrust Case: Rejoinder, J. Indus., Competition & 
Trade: From Theory to Policy (forthcoming August 2001). 
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Another remedy proposal is auctioning the Windows source code. Given the 
fluctuating stock market value of Microsoft, Windows source code may be worth as 
much as $200 billion. No company can bid that much cash in an auction. (Practically 
speaking, only a handful of foreign governments could).  This implies that the source 
code of Windows would be sold forcibly at a small fraction of its worth – and that would 
severely reduce the value of shareholders’ equity.  Auctioning the Windows code would 
not only effectively confiscate Microsoft’s intellectual property, it would also seriously 
reduce the incentive for innovation not only for Microsoft but for all potential innovators.  
Moreover, source code evolves.  Over time, different firms will add and alter the 
Windows code. Soon, incompatibilities will arise, with all the negative consequences of 
diminution of network effects described earlier.  
 
A second remedy proposal would be to impose on Microsoft to disclose some of 
the so-called “APIs” (lines of software code that define interfaces between applications) 
that permit it to include Internet Explorer in the operating system.  Microsoft routinely 
discloses APIs that hook applications to the operating system and allow for 
interoperability.  Currently, it does not disclose APIs that tie together parts of the 
Windows operating system, which includes Internet Explorer.  If Microsoft were to 
disclose the APIs that hook Internet Explorer to other parts of the operating system, 
Netscape (or any other browser) could have the same interoperability with Windows.51 
 
A third remedy proposal—and in my mind, the best—would be to consider 
imposing various restrictions on the contracts that Microsoft can write with sellers of 
complementary goods and with competitors. This is a likely remedy that is easy to tailor 
according to the violation.  This remedy—possibly combined with requiring Microsoft to 
disclose certain APIs—should be sufficient to guarantee that Microsoft will be precluded 
from taking future anti-competitive actions. At the same time, it would preserve the 
managerial and other benefits that have made Microsoft one of the most successful and 
most profitable companies ever.  
 
Some have proposed regulation of the operating systems part of Microsoft as a 
way to guarantee that there would be no leverage of market power.   There are very 
significant reasons to avoid regulation at this stage.  First, regulation is inappropriate for 
an industry that evolves quickly.  Regulation requires a stable product.  For example, 
regulation of AT&T did not occur until 35 years had passed after the invention of the 
telephone, despite the fact that (i) telecommunications had much stronger network effects 
than software; and (ii) during its first 40 years, AT&T took much more aggressive actions 
than Microsoft, including refusal to deal and refusal to interconnect with competitors.  
Second, regulation could stagnate innovation.  Third, in an industry with fast technical 
progress, regulation can be used by the regulated companies to keep prices high, as 
exemplified by telecommunications regulation. 
 
                                                          
51  This is a disclosure of a few APIs that hook IE to Windows.  It does not imply a disclosure of a 
large number of APIs, which would be almost equivalent to disclosure of the Windows source code.  
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14. Concluding Remarks 
 
The most significant recent developments in this case were the filing of the appeal 
of Microsoft, the filing of the government’s objections, and the open hearing of the case 
by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit sitting en banc in late February 2001.  The 
questioning of both sides by the judges of the court of appeals was very frank and 
pointed.  Most of the criticism of the appeals judges  (as seen by their questions and by 
the heated dialog with the lawyers of both sides) was aimed towards the plaintiffs.  On a 
number of occasions, the appeals court judges questioned the validity of the district 
court’s  “findings of fact,” calling them conclusions not based on fact.51  The appeals 
court also seemed to question the strength of the plaintiffs’ case (i) on the tying 
allegation, as well as (ii) on attempting to monopolize the browser market allegation.   
 
The appeals court was critical of the procedure that Judge Jackson used in the 
remedies part of the case,52 as well as of the necessity and effectiveness of the ordered 
remedy (breakup).53  The appeals court also seemed to be very critical of Judge Jackson’s 
                                                          
51  For example, at the February 27, 2001 morning hearing, judges questioned Jeffrey P. Minear, 
representing the United States, as follows: 
“THE COURT:  The District Court, like I said, there are some findings that are merely just 
conclusions and I find no basis for them.  So I’m not in that camp that says because the 
District Court lists something under findings of fact it’s gospel.  There has to be a fact in fact.  
THE COURT:  It has to be supported.  
THE COURT:  And it has to be supported by something other than the mere statement of the 
District Court.”  
In a second example from the same hearing, a judge asks Mr. Minear: 
“THE COURT:  Let me ask you again so that you can help me.  This is one of the cases, one 
of the places for me, where the failure of the findings of fact to point to any record, citations, 
makes it very, very difficult on appellate review because they are very conclusionary 
statements here that I tried to trace to determine whether there was any real data to support the 
observation that there was a market for browserless operating systems.  It is certainly not 
intuitive given that all of the operating systems offer browsers that can be removed or deleted.  
But in making your argument that in all the other cases they can be removed and 
therefore Microsoft is forcing, you’re ignoring Microsoft’s counter-argument which is they 
don’t integrate as deeply.  
 But in any event, make that your second answer.  Tell me if there is any data to back up 
… I quite frankly ... I hear my colleagues in the first part of this argument that we’re supposed 
to defer to factual findings.  But when I find factual findings that look very conclusionary and 
there is no citation to anything, I don’t think my obligation as an appellate court is to defer to 
them.  So what is the data?” 
 
52  For example, at the February 27, 2001 morning hearing , a judge asked David C. Frederick, 
representing the United States: 
“THE COURT:  Let me ask you a couple of questions about the standard applied by the 
District Court.  The District Court said that the plaintiffs won the case, and for that reason 
alone have some entitlement to a remedy of their choice.  The District Court also said these 
officials are by reason of office obliged and expected to consider and to act in the public 
interest.  Microsoft is not.  Are those appropriate standards for a District Judge to consider in 
framing a remedy?” 
 
53  For example, at the February 27, 2001 morning hearing , a judge pointed to David C. Frederick, 
representing the United States: 
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extended interviews with journalists and strongly suggested that if the case is remanded 
to a lower court (for either a new determination of facts, or for determination of remedies, 
or both) that it should not go to Judge Jackson.54  Overall, the court of appeals appeared 
unlikely to affirm all three parts of the liability decision of the lower court and also 
unlikely to affirm the breakup remedy. 
 
It is almost certain that the appeals court will reverse the tying decision and will 
find Microsoft not liable on tying.  In my opinion, it is likely that the major parts of the 
rest of the district court’s decision would also be reversed.  After review by the appeals 
court and possibly by the U. S. Supreme Court, it is extremely unlikely that the final 
outcome will be a breakup of Microsoft.  In fact, the final remedy imposed on Microsoft 
or the terms of a possible settlement of the DOJ suit are very likely to be weaker than 
DOJ’s settlement terms of March 30, 2000, to which Microsoft is reported to have 
agreed.55  
 
It is most likely that the federal part of the case will be settled after the court of 
appeals decision.  Microsoft will have very significant legal fees and related costs, as it 
also faces a large number of civil antitrust suits by class action plaintiffs.  The breakup 
would be disastrous, but, in my opinion, is extremely unlikely to be upheld.  The biggest 
loss to Microsoft is the continuous antitrust scrutiny that does not allow it to make 
significant acquisitions in telecommunications and the Internet in the United States 
during the period of intense antitrust scrutiny. 
 
The antitrust trial has put a tremendous pressure on Microsoft.  If the company 
was not controlled by Bill Gates and employees, it is very likely that, in the short-term 
interest of the shareholders, Microsoft would have compromised with DOJ, even though 
this is likely to have harmed the long-term interests of shareholders.  As things stand in 
May 2001, the stock price of Microsoft is down about 40 percent because of the 
continuing antitrust uncertainty. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
“THE COURT:  Stranger still, even after the remedy, Microsoft retains the monopoly.  You 
cited Grinnell, and I think there’s a point in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Grinnell that says 
the first order of business when there’s been a Section 2 violation is to issue a remedy that 
will destroy the monopoly power.  This remedy doesn’t do that.”   
In another question in the same hearing, a judge notes the potential problems that a breakup might 
create and the fact that there was no hearing to discuss them:  
“THE COURT:  No, no, no.  The question that’s being raised is whether a company that has 
not grown through combinations can be perforated along the lines proposed by the 
government without a hearing into the problems that might create.” 
 
54  For example, at the February 27, 2001 afternoon hearing , a judge asked John G. Roberts, 
representing the States plaintiffs:  
“THE COURT:  Well, I’m not sure that I see how you can with a straight face ask us if we 
remand, to send it to the same judge after these comments.” 
 
55   Provided of course that published reports of the settlement proposal in the New York Times and 
elsewhere are correct as summarized.. 
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Regardless of the final outcome, the effects of U.S. v. Microsoft are likely to be 
felt for a long time. If a breakup actually occurs, it is likely to impose the dark shadow of 
radical antitrust intervention on the whole computer industry.  There are many firms in 
the computer sector that have a dominant position in their respective markets.  I would 
expect, if on appeal DOJ wins big on Microsoft (which is very unlikely) and if DOJ takes 
a principled approach, antitrust suits against Yahoo, AOL, and other pioneers of the New 
Economy will not be far behind.  
 
 42 CYBER RIGHTS, PROTECTION, AND MARKETS [Vol. 32 
15. Bibliography 
 
Amicus Curiae Brief Of Professor Lawrence Lessig, United States v. Microsoft, Civil 
Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ). 
 
Areeda, Phillip and Louis Kaplow (1997), Antitrust Analysis, Aspen Law & Business. 
 
Brinkley, Joel and Steve Lohr (2000), U.S. v. Microsoft, McGraw Hill. 
 
Cass, Ronald A., (1999), “Copyright, Licensing, And The ‘First Screen’,” mimeo., 
Boston University, School of Law. 
 
Cass, Ronald A., and Keith N. Hylton, (1999), “Preserving Competition: Economics 
Analysis, Legal Standards And Microsoft,” Boston University, School of Law, 
Law & Economics Working paper no. 99-1. 
 
Conclusions Of Law, United States v. Microsoft, Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ) & State 
of New York v. Microsoft Civil Action No. 98-1233 (TPJ). 
 
Davis, Steven J., Jack MacCrisken, and Kevin M. Murphy, (1998),  Integrating New 
Features Into The PC Operating System: Benefits, Timing, And Effects On 
Innovation,” mimeo. 
 
D’Aspremont, Claude, Jaskold-Gabszewicz, Jean, and Thisse, Jacques-Francois, (1979), 
“On Hotelling’s ‘Stability in Competition’,” Econometrica, vol. 47, pp. 
1145-1150. 
 
Economides, Nicholas (1984), The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Revisited,” 
European Economic Review, vol. 24, pp. 345-368. 
 
Economides, Nicholas (1996), “The Economics of Networks,” International Journal of 
Industrial Organization vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 675-699, at 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/top.html.   
 
Economides, Nicholas (1999), “Competition and Vertical Integration in the Computing 
Industry,” in  Competition, Innovation, and the Microsoft Monopoly: Antitrust in 
the Digital Marketplace, Jeffrey A. Eisenach and Thomas M. Lenard (eds.), 
Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999, at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/98-
11.pdf. . 
 
Economides, Nicholas (2001a), “Industry Fragmentation After A Microsoft Breakup,” 
mimeo. 
 
Economides, Nicholas (2001b), “The Microsoft Antitrust Case” Journal of Industry, 
Competition and Trade: From Theory to Policy (August 2001). 
 
2001] ISSUES OF THE MICROSOFT ANTITRUST       43
Economides, Nicholas (2001c),  “The Microsoft Antitrust Case: Rejoinder” Journal of 
Industry, Competition and Trade: From Theory to Policy (August 2001). 
 
Economides, Nicholas, and Fredrick Flyer (1998), “Compatibility and Market Structure 
for Network Goods,” Discussion Paper EC-98-02, Stern School of Business, 
N.Y.U., http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/98-02.pdf . 
 
Elzinga, Kenneth G., and David E. Mills (1999), “PC Software,” The Antitrust Bulletin, 
vol. 44, page 739. 
 
Evans, David S., and Richard L. Schmalensee, “Be Nice to Your Rivals: How the 
Government is Selling an Antitrust Case Without Consumer Harm in United 
States v. Microsoft,” in Did Microsoft Harm Consumers? Two Opposing Views, 
American Enterprise Institute-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 
Washington DC 2000. 
 
Evans, David S., Albert Nichols, and Bernard Reddy, (1999), “The Rise And Fall Of 
Leaders In Personal Computer Software,” mimeo., NERA. 
 
Findings of Fact, United States v. Microsoft, Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ) & State of 
New York v. Microsoft Civil Action No. 98-1233 (TPJ). 
 
Fisher, Franklin M., Written testimony, Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ) & State of New 
York v. Microsoft Civil Action No. 98-1233 (TPJ). 
 
Fisher, Franklin M. (2001), “Innovative Industries And Antitrust: Implications Of The 
Microsoft Case,” Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade: From Theory to 
Policy (August 2001).  
 
Fisher, Franklin M., and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, “United States v. Microsoft: An Economic 
Analysis,” in Did Microsoft Harm Consumers? Two Opposing Views, American 
Enterprise Institute-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Washington 
DC 2000. 
 
Hatch, Orrin G. (1999), “Antitrust in the Digital Age,” in  Competition, Innovation, and 
the Microsoft Monopoly: Antitrust in the Digital Marketplace, Jeffrey A. Eisenach 
and Thomas M. Lenard (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999. 
 
Klein, Benjamin, (1999), “Microsoft’s Use Of Zero Price Bundling To Fight The 
‘Browser Wars’,” in  Competition, Innovation, and the Microsoft Monopoly: 
Antitrust in the Digital Marketplace, Jeffrey A. Eisenach and Thomas M. Lenard 
(eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999. 
 
Lenard, Thomas M., (2000), “Creating Competition in the Market for Operating Systems: 
A Structural Remedy for Microsoft,” mimeo. The Progress & Freedom 
Foundation. 
 44 CYBER RIGHTS, PROTECTION, AND MARKETS [Vol. 32 
 
Levinson, Robert J., R. Craig Romaine, and Steven C. Salop, (1999), “The Flawed 
Fragmentation Critique of Structural Remedies in the Microsoft Case,” 
Georgetown University Law Center, Working Paper No. 204874. 
 
Litan, Robert E., Roger G. Noll, William D. Nordhaus, and Frederic Scherer, “Remedies 
Brief Of Amici Curiae In Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ).”  
 
McKenzie, Richard B. (2000), Trust on Trial, Perseus Publishing. 
 
Reback, Gary L. et al., Memorandum Of Amici Curiae In Opposition To Proposed Final 
Judgment, Civil Action No. 94-1564. 
 
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Support Of Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. 
Microsoft, Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ). 
 
Reddy, Bernard, David Evans and Albert Nichols (2000), “Why Does Microsoft Charge 
So Little For Windows?,” mimeo. 
 
Romaine, R. Craig and Steven C. Salop (1999), “Alternative Remedies for 
Monopolization in the Microsoft Case,” mimeo. 
 
Shaked, Avner and John Sutton, (1982), “Relaxing Price Competition Through Product 
Differentiation,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 49, pp. 3-14. 
 
United States v. Microsoft, conference at New York University (May 5, 2000), in 
streaming video at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/video.html.  
 
United States Court Of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit (2001), transcript of oral argument 
in United States v. Microsoft, case no. 00.5213, February 26-27, 2001. 
